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ABSTRACT
THE LIMITS OF LOCATION PRIVACY IN MOBILE DEVICES
MAY 2020
KEEN YUUN SUNG
B.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Brian Neil Levine
Mobile phones are widely adopted by users across the world today. However, the
privacy implications of persistent connectivity are not well understood. is dissertation
focuses on one important concern of mobile phone users: location privacy.
I approach this problem from the perspective of three adversaries that users are ex-
posed to via smartphone apps: the mobile advertiser, the app developer, and the cellular
service provider. First, I quantify the proportion of mobile users who use location permis-
sive apps and are able to be tracked through their advertising identier, and demonstrate
a mark and recapture aack that allows continued tracking of users who hide these iden-
tiers. Ninety-ve percent of the 1500 devices we tested were susceptible to this aack.
We successfully identied 49% of unlabelled impressions from iOS devices, and 59% from
Android, with a budget of only $5 per day, per user. Next, I evaluate an aack wherein a
remote server discovers a user’s traveled path without permission, simply by analyzing
vi
the throughput of the connection to the user over time. In these experiments, a remote
aacker can distinguish a user’s route among four paths within a University campus with
77% accuracy, and among eight paths surrounding the campus with 83% accuracy. I then
propose a protocol for anonymous cell phone usage, which obviates the need for users
to trust telecoms with their location, and I evaluate its ecacy against a passive location
proling aack used to infer identity. According to these simulations, even one day is
enough to identify one device from among over a hundred with greater than 50% accu-
racy. To mitigate location proling aacks, users should change these identiers every
ten minutes and remain oine for 30 seconds, to reduce their identiability by up to 45%.
I conclude by summarizing the key issues in mobile location privacy today, immediate
steps that can be taken to improve them, and the inherent privacy costs of remaining
constantly connected.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
You have zero privacy anyway.
Get over it.
Sco McNealy, Wired, 1999
Many consider “cell phone privacy” to be an oxymoron. Users depend on smartphones,
but are usually forced into privacy policy agreements by monopolistic service providers:
either trust us, or don’t use our service. While a slim majority disapprove of surveillance
actions by the government and technology corporations [94], many have accepted that
a lack of privacy has simply become a way of life — a necessary cost for technological
enrichment. But it has chilling eects on online behaviour: there are things that you
might be afraid to Google.
When you use your phone, there are many opportunities for your privacy to be in-
fringed upon. A mobile app may contain ads, which not only promote goods and services,
but also send some data about your phone back to advertisers. e app itself may collect
data about you and send information back to the developer — that is why phones require
you to permit access to certain behaviours. e cell service provider themselves collect
data about your movements and communications.
Location privacy in cell phones is particularly invasive and dicult to protect. Inter-
net services and physical location are intertwined; every data packet is sent to a physical
device that is somewhere on the planet, so any party who is responsible for forwarding
it must have some information about where it is headed. At the same time, location data
is the one aspect of privacy that has implications on a user’s physical security. We are
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expected to trust corporate entities and governments with this data, but their trustwor-
thiness is questionable. In July 2019, the Electronic Frontier Foundation led a class-action
lawsuit against AT&T for selling users’ real-time locations to bounty hunters [5].
My thesis shines a light on this tension between privacy and utility of mobile Internet
services. I ask how much privacy you must necessarily sacrice to continue using a ser-
vice. I also look at methods to protect your location information. I consider each of the
parties involved in an app service — an advertiser, a developer, and a cell service provider
— and study scenarios in which user privacy is at risk. I show that protecting privacy does
not require a complete sacrice of connectivity, but does demand some changes in policy
and implementation, and conservative behaviour.
1.1 Approach to studying privacy and utility
Private information is data about an individual that she does not want someone else
to have. Ideally, users choose to trust an entity with personal information, and any infor-
mation revealed to the entity is passed with consent; alas, this is oen not the case. To
measure privacy, we look specically at what the individual (or user) wants to hide, and
the party whom wants to arrogate it (the aacker). Without an aacker, there is no pri-
vacy problem. e specic method that an aacker uses to gain this information against
the user’s will is an aack.
To investigate an aack, I dene aacker models that formalize assumptions about
user behaviour and aacker ability. In each of my studies, the aacker has access to time-
stamped series of unlabelled information, or traces. is information is logged as a result
of user connectivity — this may be web access records or phone call detail logs. ese
traces contain information in some form that can be used to link a user to their loca-
tion. We measure privacy in terms of the probability that this information can accurately
establish this link.
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In these aacks, user identity or location information is inferred through the use of
various classiers. e location information itself is potentially revealed through several
channels. I discuss mobile ads in Chapter 1, which can reveal information both at the
application or network layers [37], through GPS and IP address respectively. In Chapter
2, I discuss how throughput measurements are aected by physical layer factors such
as radio signal occlusions and cell tower distance. In Chapter 3, I discuss a method to
remain anonymous against a cellular network provider, who oversees cellular signalling
and controls both the physical and network layers. We quantify the performance of these
inference aacks using datasets that we have collected or acquired from other institutions.
With this knowledge, we recommend solutions to x these issues. is results in a
sacrice of some amount of utility — a reduction in performance or quality of service.
1.2 Overview of studies
In each of the three studies, I fundamentally ask (1) how connectivity and signalling
give away your location or other private information about you, and (2) what you need
to sacrice to regain privacy.
1.2.1 Re-identifying mobile devices in advertising networks
Users are tracked through ads on the Internet. On the web, users are exposed to track-
ing cookies. On Android and iOS apps, users are tracked using an advertising identier
(ad ID). Because ad IDs put users’ privacy at risk, both OSes allow the ID to be reset, or
disabled completely by turning on Limit Ad Tracking (LAT). In apps, ads are shown in
web views that support storage and caching mechanisms. ese functions are a vulnera-
bility that allows advertisers to mark devices whether LAT is enabled or not; our marking
methods worked on more than all of the thousands of devices we encountered. Becoming
an online advertiser has a very low barrier of entry; anyone with a few dollars and an In-
ternet connection can perform this aack. In experiments where we deployed hundreds
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of thousands of ads, we quantied the cost of marking and retargeting without an ad ID;
of the successfully marked devices, 49% of iOS impressions, and 59% of Android, were
successfully labelled with a budget of $5 per day. We additionally veried this method
on 1,727 devices and recovered 660 of them within 48 hours for $86.73. We recommend
that app developers disable storage and caching in ad web views since it would result in
a negligible performance cost.
1.2.2 Using throughput to deduce user location
Smartphones contain a GPS sensor that can nely locate users in real time. Because of
the sensitive nature of location data, all smartphones give users precise control over app
and OS access to the sensor. A user’s location can be deduced by a second party simply
through changes in connection quality; for example, I can tell when you are going through
a tunnel when your signal drops briey during a phone call. We leveraged this idea in an
automated aack that can be performed by any web or app service. Given a sequence trace
of per-second network throughput measurements, how well can an aacker infer the path
of a user? We collected hundreds of throughput traces by streaming music to phones to
simulate two scenarios: a campus user travelling to or from four dierent towns, and a
user travelling within our campus. We evaluated three classiers: k-nearest neighbours
(k-NN), a hidden Markov model (HMM), and a naı¨ve Bayes classier with kernel density-
based estimates (NB-KDE). In our experiments, NB-KDE performed best, identifying the
path and direction among two roads within a University campus (four classes) with 77%
accuracy, and the path and direction among four roads around campus (eight classes) with
83% accuracy. e only mitigation to this aack is trac shaping — articially randomly
slowing the connection to confuse the classier.
1.2.3 Establishing a protocol for anonymous usage of a cellular network
Because connectivity cannot be hidden by nature (the untrusted entity always knows
when it is party to a connection), users seek anonymity instead. In cellular networks, this
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anonymity currently comes in the form of a prepaid, disposable phone and SIM card. But
these phones are easily compromised, especially if the anonymous user exhibits habitual
behaviour. Aackers can build a location prole about a user and guess which prepaid
phone is theirs by matching the prole to unlabelled sequences of cell tower connections.
Additionally, aackers can link trajectories of unlabelled sequences to beer inform their
inferences. We show that buying a new phone intermiently is insucient to preserve
privacy. In fact, if a user shows regularity in her behaviour, one month is enough for
an aacker to identify with 69% accuracy among over a hundred users. Even one day is
enough to reidentify a device with greater than 50% accuracy. We introduce a protocol
called ZipPhone, which allows a community of privacy-seeking users to strategically time
their connections to remain anonymous while incurring a minimal loss of utility. We
evaluate ZipPhone from the perspectives of both the cell service provider and the user
community, and quantify the privacy/utility trade-o using two datasets containing cell
tower logs of hundreds of users. We present and assess a deanonymization algorithm
that combines both location proling and trajectory linking aacks, and show that by
sacricing 30 seconds of uptime every ten minutes, they can thwart the aacks and reduce
identiability from 69% to 24%.
1.3 Collaborators
All three studies were conducted under the supervision of Brian Levine. e study
featured in Chapter 2 was a collaboration with Mark Corner, Brian Levine, and JianYi
Huang. Chapter 3 was done in collaboration with Joydeep Biswas, Erik Learned-Miller,
Brian Levine, Marc Liberatore, and Hamed Soroush. Chapter 4 was done in collaboration
with Brian Levine, Marc Liberatore, and Mariya Zheleva.
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CHAPTER 2
RE-IDENTIFYING MOBILE DEVICES IN ADVERTISING
NETWORKS
2.1 Overview
Advertisers are oen reviled, but they are an invaluable part of the mobile ecosystem.
Not only do they fund many games and services that are free to the user, they also save
the user from giving out their credit card number and personal information to vendors
they may not trust.
On the other hand, by using mobile apps supported by advertisements, users allow
ne-grained information to be shared with hundreds of entities in the advertising ecosys-
tem. Advertising libraries embedded in apps facilitate the dissemination of the device’s
uniquemobile advertising identier (ad ID), IP address, user-agent string, application name,
and ne-grained GPS coordinates to entities that bid for ad space via open Real-Time Bid-
ding (RTB) marketplaces [87]. Advertisers collect this information on the showing of an
ad, and can use the ad ID or other information to link together subsequent encounters
of a device. ese logs are used to build detailed proles about a user device, including
information about preferences, habits, and locations frequented.
Users should aim to protect their privacy by (i) preventing revealing information such
as location or IP address from being associated to these encounters, and (ii) preventing
the logged encounters themselves from being linked together, so that if an encounter is
inferred, the damage is minimized. As we show in this chapter, even when users take steps
to hide or disable application access to information that could identify them, advertisers
can still re-identify devices in RTB networks. e lack of controls in advertising’s access
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to web APIs for storage allow advertisers to leave a retrievable mark on the user’s device,
retarget groups of devices that may contain the user, and then verify the mark when an
ad is shown. is re-identication of users can happen even when the user disables or
changes the ad ID, uses a VPN, or disallows location.
In work submied to MobiCom (2020) in collaboration with Brian Levine, Mark Cor-
ner, and JianYi Huang, we quantify the eectiveness of the tools available to RTB adver-
tisers to re-identify mobile devices carried by users, including cases where the user has
taken steps to prevent it. We determine eectiveness in terms of the cost in dollars based
on real campaigns we executed. To fully control exposure of identifying information,
a user must cobble together several privacy-preserving techniques, and is vulnerable to
several pitfalls:
• First, a user can be uniquely re-identied by the ad ID. To control this technique, the
user must turn on privacy features found in iOS and Android. Enabling iOS’s Limit
Ad Tracking (LAT) seing zeros out the identier, making the device indistinguish-
able from other users of that feature [11]. On Android, enabling the opt out of ad
personalization (OOAP) feature is merely an advisory ag that apps and advertisers
are expected by Google to respect [1]. It’s a limited tool for users, and continuously
reseing the ad ID via a well-buried buon is simply impractical.
• Second, advertisers can make use of various methods of marking users (LocalStor-
age, IndexedDB, cookies, etc.). e mark can be used by advertiser to link observa-
tions of the same device despite a reset or zeroed-out ad ID. ere are no user-facing
methods to control this and to a large extent Android and iOS do not allow appli-
cations to prevent advertisers from using those APIs.
• ird, advertisers can leverage features to re-target devices, including device model,
app, and the IP address. Further, some IP addresses can be coarsely geolocated
to approximate locations, and many advertising services allow ads to be targeted
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within geographic fences. Additionally, advertisers can make use of precise GPS
coordinates, if the user consents to it, and many do. Users can only control this if
they awlessly use a VPN all of the time and disallow location access in the app.
We show that these three vulnerabilities are dicult to avoid, and allow an advertiser
to link encounters together cheaply, and in many cases associate them with a location.
2.1.1 Main results
Our main goal of this study was to determine the cost and ecacy of linking together
ad records that do not contain the ad ID. We additionally looked at whether users who
were trying to protect their privacy by using a VPN could still be linked to a clearnet
IP address (i.e. one that is assigned by the ISP, and oen corresponding to a geographic
location) because their ad ID was not disabled.
Our data was collected by deploying hundreds of thousands of ads (i.e. impressions)
on a self-service RTB platform. Our focus was an advertiser that seeks to maximize the
recall of impressions aributable to a specic mobile device, even when the user is trying
to prevent re-identication. Our goal was not to optimize cost, but we favored solutions
that are less expensive.
We rst performed a post hoc analysis on impressions gathered by targeting the ad
ID of 1,384 devices for one month. For about $5/day, about half of a user’s impressions
could be retrieved through marks and prole-based retargeting, compared with ad ID re-
targeting. We then performed an end-to-end experiment, aempting to re-discover 1,727
devices without using ad ID. We further recovered 38% of devices within 48 hours for
$86.73. Finally, we deployed ads to VPN users on BitTorrent apps, and found that about
two-thirds were seen on the clearnet within 26 days. Further, 68% of these devices re-
ported a precise GPS coordinate at least once.
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2.1.2 Chapter outline
Section 2.2 describes the app-based techniques we used for re-identication. To our
knowledge, we were the rst to discover and report that the in-app web views that display
ads can be used to store marks. ere are no methods that let the user disable storage or
clear the marks, other than deleting and reinstalling the app. Our adversarial model is
outlined in Section 2.3. Specic marking methods are then detailed in Section 2.4.
In Section 2.5, our main results and cost analyses are presented. We found that without
the ad ID entirely, about 75% of Android devices can be re-identied in the rst week using
marks, and 81% of iOS devices. Even 30 days later, 61% of our Android impressions and
71% of iOS contained marks to re-identify the device. We then show that it is possible
to re-identify devices in campaigns even without the ad ID. Devices were found again
on previously visited non-cellular IPs 78% of the time on average. On average, devices
seen in one week were found within 10 km in 80% of instances the next week. Devices
with iOS are signicantly more dicult to re-identify because the dierent Apple device
models are not distinguished. We then perform a cost analysis to determine the cost to an
advertiser to use this method.
Lastly, in Section 2.6, we perform two case studies. First, we determined the cost and
performance of aempting to rediscover over a thousand devices using information from
only one impression, and without using the ad ID at all. Second, we show that ads can
very eectively reveal the clearnet IPs (and locations) of users of BitTorrent apps masked
by a VPN service.
2.2 Background on mobile advertising
ere are many modalities of purchasing advertisements, from walled-garden adver-
tising systems such as Facebook, to relatively open real-time bidding (RTB) networks. In
RTB, apps that want to sell ad space (i.e., publishers) work with Supply Side Platforms
(SSPs), and entities that wish to show their ads (i.e., advertisers) work with Demand Side
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Figure 2.1: is ad was used for our data collection.
Platforms (DSPs). When an app shows an advertisement it contacts one or more SSPs, e
SSP brokers an auction amongst a set of DSPs who bid on behalf of the advertisers they
represent. e highest bidder wins, and the winning ad (known as a creative) is sent to
the user’s device. When the app shows the creative, it is called an impression. is auction
happens in fractions of a second and is summarized in Figure 2.3. Further details of the
RTB ecosystem can be found in works by Vines et al. [108] and Corner et al. [32]. Small
ads are very inexpensive, e.g., typically $0.10–$5.00 per 1000 shown (per mille, in industry
parlance).
2.2.1 Information return
Once a bid has been won, the device is sent a snippet of HTML code, commonly called
an ad tag, and the app displays it within an embedded web view. is snippet may contain
HTML elements that are requested directly from the advertiser. A sample of our deployed
ad tag is shown in Figure 2.2. is HTML code contains the advertiser’s creative image and
tracking mechanics, including pixels or beacons that allow the advertiser to verify that the
10
<!-- This ad is part of a research project at Location A. ...
//-->
<a href="https://www.example.tld">
<img id="splash_pixel" style="display:none"
src="https://api.example.tld/pixel.gif?impression=${impression_id
}&device_identifier=${device_identifier}&${imp_id}&gps=${gps}&
campaign=${campaign_id}..." /></a>
<script src="https://api.example.tld/mark.js">
</script>
Figure 2.2: is is a simplied excerpt of the dynamic ad tag we used in experiments. It
contains ad macros which are replaced by the DSP. It also contains a call to a JavaScript
le on our server, which performs the marking functions. A static ad would only include
the URL of the image pixel.gif le, conventionally an empty 1× 1 pixel image.
impression was successful. e DSP substitutes the ad macros with information obtained
from either the device, or third-party data providers. is information includes an ad ID
(when available), the time, the service provider, location (when available), the app, and
some device information. Ad IDs are 16-byte UUIDs and are called the ID for Advertisers
(IFA) in iOS and the Google Ad ID in Android. e location information is provided by the
device GPS when it is available or IP-based geolocation service.
By including and serving an image in the tag, the advertiser can collect the device’s
IP address. Device information can be inpued as query string parameters in the image’s
URL, and the advertiser keeps a log of resource requests that would include the URL and
the connecting IP address. If the advertiser returns JavaScript as part of the ad, then it can
access browser APIs, such as storage in IndexedDB and LocalStorage. None of the above
requires clicking the ad.
2.2.2 Device retargeting
Advertisers on RTB systems can target and retarget devices based on features such
as location, IP address, ISP, app, device, and time of day. Advertisers oen use ad IDs to
retarget the same device over time. ad IDs are unique to the device and shared across
all apps on the device (and not available from ads viewed with a normal web browser).
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Figure 2.3: Sequence diagram of a single real-time bidding cycle
ese device-level identiers are very powerful as they are consistent across all apps on
the device. Users have some control over their privacy: on both Android and iOS, users
can reset the ID at any time, and on iOS the ad ID can be disabled outright.
Devices can also be retargeted by the coarse geolocation or their precise GPS location.
Weather and dating apps oen share precise GPS [33], and surprisingly so do BitTorrent
apps. Home and work IP addresses typically match a small number of devices and are
oen very persistent [93]. But even in the case of shared IP addresses, such as those at
a library or coee shop, the geolocation of the IP address massively narrows down the
number of possible users while retargeting devices. Cellular IPs are much broader as
geolocating such IPs could be several states wide in the USA [21]. We discuss location in
more detail in Section 2.4.2.
2.3 Adversarial model
Our adversary uses RTB to place advertising impressions on mobile devices with the
following goal:
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Goal: to maximize the recall of impressions on a particular mobile device even when the
device’s user tries to prevent re-identication (such as reseing or clearing the ad ID,
denying the application access to location, or using a VPN).
Our goal is not to optimize cost, but we favor solutions that are less expensive.
e user may reset their ad ID periodically or disable it (seing it to all zeros). e user
may make use of many IP addresses as a natural consequence of movement, or because
of their use of a cellular NAT, or a VPN. e user may explicitly allow access to GPS
locations, but cannot prevent the advertiser from using a geo-location service based on
their IP address.
We evaluate an adversary’s success rate and cost of re-identifying a device over the
course of a month. During that time, the user can either disable her ad ID, reset it daily,
or reset it weekly. e adversary does not aim to discover the true identity of the user;
rather, the adversary tries to associate anonymous behaviour with previous activity.
e most obvious defense against the advertiser (excluding buying the ad-free version
of an app) is to use a VPN, which can mask the user’s clearnet IP address (i.e., an address
assigned by an ISP that maintains DHCP records and accurate billing information). us,
in Section 2.6.2, we explore an alternate goal: to determine the clearnet IP address (and
therefore geographic locale) of a device masked by a VPN.
2.3.1 Self-service vantage point
In RTB systems, there are multiple vantage points to observe users: as the developer of
the advertising SDK in the app, the SSP, the DSP, and as a ”self-service” user of a DSP. e
developer of the advertising SDK can trivially track users as they have full native access
to the device. e SSP and DSP see all bid requests coming from the device and can track
users at no additional economic cost, though they can only access data available in the
bid request. We have chosen to analyze the weakest vantage point: that of the self-service
user. One can sign up with a self-service DSP easily; minimum spend is typically $100USD.
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Becoming a full-edged DSP is a major undertaking with additional controls applied by
the SSPs. A self-service adversary can target ads to users, but only gets feedback when an
impression is won. erefore, collecting data has an economic cost, typically 10 cents to
$5 for each 1000 ads (called a CPM).
Several factors aect the ability of the self-service advertiser to retarget a device. First,
there is only an opportunity to place an impression when the user opens the app. e
advertiser must have funds to pay for the opportunity and win the auction. e adversary
has greater success when features of the device can be used to increase precision. Some
DSPs oer location-based targeting, and support for targeting specic device models and
apps is common. e best case scenario for the advertiser is targeting of a specic ad ID.
2.4 Methodology
To evaluate the ability of advertisers to meet the adversarial goals we dene in Sec-
tion 2.3, we implemented a strategy for an adversary to re-identify users in RTB networks.
Starting from an initial ad impression, the adversary uniquely marks the device, then later
retargets advertisements to a prole that includes the original device, and nally conrms
which device was the original one by reading the mark. Here, we detail our implementa-
tion for marking devices and then retargeting them to rediscover particular devices.
2.4.1 Marking implementation
We have discovered that the same APIs available to browser-based pages are available
unheeded to advertisements. As in-app advertisements are shown within embedded web
views, this allows ads to use any browser-based method of storing unique identiers in
the device and using it as an identication mark.
We identied and implemented seven dierent methods of marking devices, listed in
Figure 2.4. In our implementation, we had access to JavaScript-based ads, giving us access
to browser APIs for the rst four features: LocalStorage, IndexedDB, Web SQL, and the
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Feature JS Non-JS iOS Android
1. LocalStorage 3 3
2. IndexedDB 3 3 3
3. Web SQL 3 3∗ 3
4. Cache API 3 3∗ 3∗
5. Unique, Cached JS le 3 3 3
6. Cookies 3 3 3∗ 3
7. HTTP ETag 3 3 3 3
Figure 2.4: Seven storage-based marking features that we evaluated. 3∗ indicates partial
support.
cache. As a h feature, our implementation served unique JavaScript les to each user
that contained the mark; that mark is accessible when the cached JavaScript is executed
in subsequent ads.
In some cases, an advertiser may not have access to serving JavaScript as part of the
advertisement. In those cases the advertiser typically uses 1x1 tracking pixels, which the
advertisement fetches from the advertiser’s servers. To support these cases, we imple-
mented our sixth and seventh marking methods, respectively: set and retrieve a cookie
when responding to the tracking pixel; and HTTP ETags, which browsers transmit to the
server to re-validate an expired cache item. e ETag is set in one ad, and then sent to the
server by the phone in a subsequent ad.
If either the user or developer of the ad SDK can prevent or erase such marks, then
user privacy would be increased: the adversary cannot know that they found the exact
device again, only that it is one of the many devices in the re-targeted group.
For a user to prevent marking, they only have three coarse options: (i) they can clear
stored information by deleting all of the app’s data and reinstalling; (ii) they can buy a
version of the app that has no advertisements, if available; or (iii) not use the app at all.
A beer option is for developers of ad SDKs to congure the web view to enable or
disable the features in Figure 2.4 (as we show in Section 2.5, at least one storage method
is typically available in ad SDK web views.) Completely disabling web view storage is
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non-trivial for developers on both iOS and Android. e programming calls to disable are
not well documented; we discuss a method we discovered through testing in Section 2.7.
A disadvantage of re-indentifying devices with web view-based marks is that each app
is sandboxed. Tags stored on one of these in-app web views cannot be seen by other apps.
is means that all re-identication of devices must take place within a single app.
2.4.2 Retargeting strategy
e advertiser has to balance re-identifying the user with the economic cost. A typical
DSP gives access to billions of advertising opportunities per day. When the ad ID is not
available, the advertiser must avoid advertising to such a large crowd that it becomes
economically infeasible.
Figure 2.5 lists the retargeting features available to us from the DSP we used. We lter
impressions so that a minimum number of impressions is required to re-identify a single
user. For example, IP addresses in homes typically do not change over time; and it is
easy to retarget a device from that home by the address. Such a strategy will, however,
miss opportunities to retarget the user’s device at their workplace. Targeting a radius of
geographic locations around a rst sighting of a device captures more possibilities than
a home IP alone, although at an increased cost. Costs can be reduced by rening the
advertising targeting by including other factors, such as the device operating system, the
bundle identier for the application they use, and the device model.
Somewhat ironically, when users enable Limit Ad-Tracking on their devices, it can
make them more identiable as only one out of six users enable that option. e particular
DSP we used did not allow us to target an empty string or zero ID. If other DSPs allow
that, one could use the zero identier as a way to lter users.
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Feature Prop. matched
Device OS 0.51
Bundle 0.24
OS Version 0.18
Android Model 0.012
GPS 1.1× 10−4
IP 6.3× 10−5
Figure 2.5: Retargeting features available to advertisers, and the average proportion of
devices matching a feature. Further discussion is in Section 2.5.3.
2.5 Evaluation
Our evaluation is focused on quantifying the advertiser’s success rate and economic
cost of re-identication. We compare storage-based marks and feature-based retargeting
against persistent ad IDs. We conducted the evaluation through a self-service DSP using
banner advertisements purchased in a wide variety of mobile applications. We collected
several data sets, comprising hundreds of thousands of ad impressions using a variety
of targeting techniques. We begin with a description of the data we collected, and our
evaluation comprises three results:
• First, we determined the persistence of each marking method; we looked at how long
a mark would remain on a phone without renewing it.
• Second, we determined how oen users could be rediscovered over one month,
compared to ad ID targeting. We also performed post hoc analyses to evaluate the
relationship between cost and rediscovery success.
We also conducted two case studies, in Section 2.6.2. One of these is an end-to-end mea-
sure of cost and ecacy in aempting to rediscover 1,727 users without using ad ID, from
only one impression. Another is an evaluation of the behaviour and privacy of VPN users.
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Data set Days Imps ad IDs Filter Section
PERSIST 81 52,719 1,715 ad ID §2.5.2
LONG 33 108,084 1,384 ad ID §2.5.2
IP 3 72,508 44,055 IP §2.5.3
GPS 3 44,570 28,673 GPS §2.5.3
FIRST 4 22,319 9,986 IP/GPS §2.6.1
VPN 28 74,026 13,778 ad ID, App §2.6.2
Figure 2.6: Each data set targeted a specic hypothesis. “Filter” indicates the type of
parameter used for retargeting.
2.5.1 Data sets
We created an account on a self-service DSP and purchased JavaScript-based ban-
ner advertisements in hundreds of Android and iOS applications. ese included games,
weather applications, chat, dating, and others. Embedded in the advertisement’s HTML
code were seven dierent marking methods, as well methods that requested the DSP re-
turn the device’s IP address, geolocation, user-agent string, OS version, and any available
ad ID. While the end goal of our advertising adversary is to re-identify devices even if
users rotate or block their ad ID, we use the ad ID as the ground truth for our exper-
iments. is ground truth allowed us to know with certainty that we re-identifed the
user or if we failed to re-identify them via retargeting. Our bids were a maximum of $10
CPM; the average winning bid was $4.02025 per thousand ads. We bid extremely high to
increase our data set.
e data sets we collected are summarized in Figure 2.6. We targeted ads to eight small
US towns and two larger US cities over a period of two days. From these two days, we
randomly sampled a set of 3,099 ad IDs and split the set into two data sets.
• We placed 1,715 devices into our PERSIST data set. We retargeted each of these
using their ad ID aer 7, 20, 70, and 81 days from the original impression, with no
impression in between. e purpose of this data set was to verify the persistence of
dierent marking methods.
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• We placed the remaining 1,384 devices in our LONG data set. ese were retargeted
every two hours over a period of one month. We targeted devices that did not
disable the ad ID, and in addition to storing and reading marks, we collected geo-
coordinates, IP address, device information, and app. We used these features to
compare the performance of our strategy to ad ID retargeting.
e overhead cost of this rediscovery strategy is proportional to the number of impres-
sions allowed by the retargeting lter. We deployed several campaigns to measure the
impression rates of various lters. We used these measurements in conjunction with the
LONG data set to analyze post hoc the cost and ecacy of several targeting scenarios.
• Our IP data set consists of impressions collected from targeting a sample of 920 IP
addresses from devices in the LONG data set. Addresses were collected from the rst
ve days (i.e. the training period) and were used to quantify the cost of retargeting
by IP.
• Our GPS data set consists of impressions from retargeting a 10 km radius within 8
towns and 2 cities. From this data, we determined the correlation between impres-
sion rate and population density.
We then conduct two case studies.
• In our FIRST data set, we aempted to rediscover 1,727 devices from ve US towns
using information from only the rst impression, and without using ad ID at all.
While 1,041 devices of these devices reported ad ID, which we ignored, 686 did not
report one at all.
• Finally, we have separate data set for our VPN case study, discussed in Section 2.6.2.
2.5.2 Mark persistence
e persistence of marks varies between storage mechanisms, and the adversary’s
goal is to re-mark a device before the original mark is cleared. For example, the mark may
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Figure 2.7: (Le) Persistence of dierent marking methods without renewal. (Right) Over-
all mark persistence with renewal.
be cleared when the app has exceeded its assigned quota [9], or will be cleared when an
app or OS is reinstalled or updated.
To measure how long marks persist, we used our PERSIST data set. We set marks
using the seven techniques (described in Section 2.4.1) and intermiently retargeted the
same set of ad IDs to check if the marks disappeared. Figure 2.7 (le) shows these results.
While caching marks were mostly cleared aer one week, storage methods lasted much
longer. On iOS, LocalStorage was most usable, seen again in 69.3% of impressions aer a
week. On Android, LocalStorage is disabled by default, but IndexedDB and cookies were
both available on most apps, seen 72.0% of the time. More than half of the most persistent
marks were still retrievable aer two months.
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Unless all stored marks are cleared at the same time, the missing values can be restored
using the existing identiers, similar to the evercookie [69]. Using the LONG data set, we
quantied the persistence of overall marking if users were retargeted every two hours for
a month. ese results are summarized in Figure 2.7 (right). Marks on Android devices had
about the same persistence as IndexedDB or cookies alone, indicating that when marks
are cleared, they are all cleared at once. On the other hand, iOS impressions were recalled
at a signicantly higher rate, remaining at 75% recall aer one month, indicating that
dierent marks were cleared at dierent times.
2.5.3 Retargeting
e cost to rediscover a device depends on the retargeting lter; more permissive
lters are more likely to nd a particular device again, but also increase the number of
non-target devices and consequently the overall cost. IP targeting can be very eective
and specic if a device connects using a consistent IP address. Geocoordinate targeting
is also especially useful since it only targets devices within a xed location, and users
generally stay in the same area.
We investigated a strategy of targeting the IP addresses seen during training, addition-
ally targeting some radius of the GPS coordinates seen, and ltering out irrelevant bids
based on static features (device model, OS, and app used). e success of this strategy
depends on the devices’ impressions matching consistent geographic coordinates and IP
addresses over time, as well as consistent use of apps.
Our basis for evaluating cost was impression rate (i.e. number of extraneous impres-
sions per day) measured over three days of testing. In both GPS and IP data sets, we
aempted to limit impressions to one per device using a ag provided by the DSP. is
impression limiting does not work perfectly; devices that do not share an ad ID could be
counted more than once. We expected the impression rate to go down, but running a
longitudinal experiment to quantify this decrease was not nancially viable.
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Figure 2.8: Ability to rediscover using IP given dierent reseing policies. e doed lines
are cellular IPs, solid line is non-cellular.
2.5.3.1 IP addresses
We rst evaluated the persistence and specicity of IP addresses used by mobile de-
vices. We expected that many non-cellular IP addresses would lead to a higher rate of
device rediscovery, and incur a low overhead of unwanted impressions, and we expected
the opposite to be true of cellular IP addresses. e laer tends to assign temporary IPs
from a pool of addresses with many users sharing a particular IP.
We considered the rst ve days of the LONG data set to be the training period, and
evaluated the overall usage of those IPs by each device during the next four weeks. Using
MaxMind [13], we were able to determine the ISP of each IP, and label them as cellular
or non-cellular. In Figure 2.8, we show that non-cellular IP is a very eective retargeting
feature: in many cases, users return to sticky IPs [93], addresses that are assigned to a
modem long term. ese IPs have a much higher recall than cellular IPs which are typi-
cally ephemeral. Figure 2.9 shows a breakdown of the same IP recall by ISP, which further
highlights the amount of privacy gained simply by using a cellular ISP. Non-cellular IPs
from some ISPs are found 80–90% of the time over the entire month, while cellular IPs are
rarely useful with less than 10% recall.
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Figure 2.9: Persistence of IP address from various ISP.
However, we must also consider how many other devices may be using the same IP
address to determine how expensive it will be to retarget a particular device. Figure 2.10
shows the impression rate of dierent ISPs, as determined from our IP data. Cellular IPs
have an impression rate in the thousands (save for Verizon with hundreds), while non-
cellular IPs, being more specic to individual users, were in the tens. In sum, devices on
non-cellular ISPs can be targeted cheaply and eectively.
2.5.3.2 Geocoodinates
IP targeting only works well if the device connects through a consistent address, how-
ever, geofencing can boost recall if the device uses another IP but remains in the same gen-
eral area. e downside of geographic targets are that they are less specic, thus more
expensive. e reported geocoordinates are provided by the DSP, but its original source
could either be from the device (GPS or network triangulation) or inferred from IP using
a service like IP2Location [12] or MaxMind [13]. We were able to identify the more ac-
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Figure 2.10: Extra impressions per day for an IP, with ad ID capping. Values shows the
median. Many of our Windstream IPs exhibited no extra impressions.
curate device-sourced locations from the number of digits of precision [33]—coordinates
truncated to the thousandth digit were likely inferred from IP.
Using coordinates for the training period of the rst ve days, we analyzed the recall
over time given dierent search radii. Figure 2.11 shows these results. With a 0 km radius
(i.e. exact match), recall was 42% in the rst week, falling to 27%. is is not because users
are returning to the exact same location many times; rather, they are connecting to the
same IP, which geolocated to the same coordinates. Conversely, looking only at the 0 km
recall for precise geocoordinate retargeting, we can see that devices are not oen in the
exact same position. Using a radius of 1 km dramatically increases recall to 67% for all
GPS impressions, and 82% for precise GPS impressions. is conrms that users and their
devices usually return to the same place; compared to locations reported during the rst
ve training days, devices regularly continued to appear in the following month within
1 km.
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To estimate the overhead, we used our GPS data set, which targeted areas with a 10 km
radius in ten population centers in the US. We compared the resulting impression rates
with measurements from the Gridded Population of the World, v4.11 data set [4], which
contains population estimates within 1 × 1 km cells. Figure 2.13 shows these measure-
ments; we veried that impression rate was correlated with known population (r=0.93,
p¡0.0001).
2.5.3.3 Additional ltering using device attributes
Finally, our lter excludes all irrelevant ad requests based on device model and app
used, to further reduce the cost. ese device aributes are unchanging, and we found
that most users are found on 2 apps, with 89.2% on their favorite app more than half the
time. We did not evaluate using OS version, which may be discriminating, but changes
over time.
Figure 2.12 shows the proportion of matching devices of each feature. Because there
are a wide variety of Android devices, model is a high entropy feature for that OS. How-
ever, all iPhones self-report as “iPhone”, making the iOS lter nine times less eective.
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Overall, the impression rates on Android devices is reduced to 0.007% using a static lter,
compared to the rate without a lter; 0.065% for iOS devices.
2.5.4 Cost
We evaluated the combined strategy of targeting the IP addresses and GPS coordinates
associated with a device, and ltering out non-matching device models and apps. We
used our LONG data combined with measurements from IP and GPS to perform post hoc
analyses and quantify the eect of cost on recall. To compute recall of a device and lter,
we compared the number of impressions that both matched the lter and had a retrievable
mark, and compared it to the total impressions seen from that ad ID. We developed lters
for each device using impressions during the ve day training period, and tested the re-
identication strategy during the following month.
Impression rates during training were determined using the IP and GPS data sets,
which targeted addresses and coordinates from the rst ve days of impressions for each
device, and reduced depending on our measurements of the popularity of the device model
and app. We determined costs using these rates, multiplied by the eective CPM of our
impressions which was $4.02. is CPM is very high for RTB banner advertisements, but
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Figure 2.13: e impression rate of our ten target locations is correlated with the census-
reported populations of the areas (r=0.93, p<0.0001) on a log-log scale. e upper bound
of our sample had a rate of less than 1 impression per population per day.
it was intentional to maximize recall—bidding optimization could lower costs in many
cases.
We evaluated the cost and recall of several scenarios, which are shown in Figure 2.14.
In each scenario, the target GPS radius increased from zero to 512 km, with the cost mono-
tonically increasing with radius. In general, targeting IP address alone results in at least
43% recall, and GPS alone results in at least 36% recall for an 8 km search radius. Combin-
ing IP and GPS targeting, this strategy achieved 49% recall on iOS, and 59% on Android,
for less than $5/day. Without IP, performance dropped to 29% and 42% respectively. On
the other hand, precise GPS devices could be rediscovered with greater than 70% recall for
$2/day, regardless of IP targeting. Far right points (which match the entire US) resulted
in recalls of 68% and 76% on iOS and Android, but these tracking eorts would cost thou-
sands of dollars per day. Android retargeting was substantially cheaper because of the
higher entropy device model targeting.
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Figure 2.14: Recall over one month of testing, against the daily cost of targeting a device.
We tested users with and without using IP address for retargeting. We separately tested
users on GPS apps. We used search radii of 0 (exact GPS match), 1, 8, 64, and 512 km;
the costs of these monotonically increase with search radii. We also tested without a GPS
lter (far right points that are most expensive). Shaded regions represent error. Daily costs
were determined by multiplying impression rate by cost per impression ($4.02 CPM, or
$0.00402 per impression).
2.6 Case Studies
To provide further insight into the cost of rediscovering a user without ad ID, and
the eectiveness of users’ privacy decisions, we conducted two additional studies. In our
rst case study, we deployed retargeting campaigns to rediscover devices based on single
impressions, and directly measured the total cost (as opposed to the post hoc calculation
in Section 2.5.4). In our second case study, we studied a population of VPN users, and
determined the ability for an aacker to nd them on a non-VPN IP address.
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Figure 2.15: e total spend of our campaign in each city. Overall, we successfully re-
discovered 660 devices out of 1,727 in 48 hours, including 288 that never reported an ad
ID.
2.6.1 Case Study 1: Rediscovering Devices with One Impression
As a real-world test, we aempted to re-identify devices using a single impression and
without targeting ad ID. is case study diers from from the LONG data set in two ways:
(i) impressions were obtained using retargeting lters, instead of from ad ID targeting
with scenarios evaluated post hoc, and (ii) we use one impression only. Since we do not
target ad ID, we do not have ground truth; we simply aim to re-discover as many devices
as possible while minimizing costs. is scenario allowed us to directly measure cost
rather than estimate it.
We targeted ve dierent towns and obtained a sample of 100 device-app combinations
in each; for example, Words with Friends on Samsung Galaxy S9+. We targeted these 500
combinations for one day, within a 10 km radius from a point within each town, and used
the DSP’s impression capping feature to limit one impression per device. (Impression
capping sometimes works for Limit At-Tracking (LAT) enabled devices; some advertis-
ing SDKs assign a proprietary temporary identier for the purpose of per-device rate
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limiting.) is campaign resulted in 2,204 impressions; using our marking methods, we
determined that these actually came from at most 1,727 unique devices. Of these devices,
686 (40%) hid their ad ID. is proportion is higher than known proportions of devices
with LAT enabled [11,14], but we have found that some apps protect this information on
the user’s behalf, or require their own explicit agreement with the user before revealing
such information to the advertiser.
We subsequently targeted the same ve towns with the same combinations, except
with a larger radius of 50 km. ese were carried out in 10 campaigns (5 towns× 2 OSes),
with all target apps and devices whitelisted within those campaigns. More specic target-
ing is possible (e.g., match app AND device rather than app OR device). In a concurrent
campaign, we targeted all of the non-cellular IP addresses from the 1,727 devices. e
cost of the retargeting campaigns totaled $86.73. e IP campaign cost $21.65, the iOS
campaigns cost $50.23, and Android campaigns cost $14.85. e disparity is due in large
part to the inability to target specic iPhone models.
Within 48 hours, we successfully rediscovered 660 (38%) of devices using mark and
retarget, 433 of them using only geotargeting and not IP address. Among the rediscovered
devices were 288 that never reported an ad ID.
2.6.2 Case Study 2: Re-identication of VPN Users
BitTorrent apps are well known to be a vehicle for trading copyrighted and illicit con-
tent [73,107], and many BitTorrent users mask their activities behind VPNs. Commercial
VPN services are marketed as tools to increase privacy and oen explicitly declare a “no
logs policy” and a lack of cooperation with investigators. VPNs are also used by journalists
to evade government restrictions [84].
In this section, we quantify the eectiveness of using RTB ads to unmask mobile de-
vices behind VPNs, using the same strategies from the previous sections. Our goal was
to determine the clearnet IP (and geographic location) of devices masked by a VPN. is
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modied goal is much closer to how investigators would apply RTB techniques; they
would not focus on impression recall.
We evaluated the two simplest mechanisms in this case study. For each device we
observed using a mobile BitTorrent app behind a VPN, we aempted to
1. nd the device on a non-VPN/clearnet IP given only the ad ID;
2. nd the device on a non-VPN/clearnet IP given only a geographic location.
We targeted ads to µtorrent, BitTorrent, tTorrent and atorrent mobile apps1. e iOS
appstore does not permit torrent applications (because they are used for illicit purposes),
and so all devices in our study are Android. We used a commercial library to determine
what IP addresses are owned by commercial VPN services.
Our campaign targeted VPN IP addresses and torrent apps, resulting in impressions
on 13,778 distinct Android ad IDs. Many of the impressions were on devices without an
ad ID because it was ltered out by the SSP or DSP due to a LAT-enabled ag. We then
retargeted these ad IDs (on any app) but restricted the campaign to clearnet IP addresses.
We were able to re-identify 3,116 (23%) of the original ad IDs. We used a maximum CPM
of $10, which is far above the level needed to be the highest bidder in the auction.
2.6.2.1 Clearnet Identication using ad IDs
In the case where a BitTorrent user does not set the Limit Ad-Tracking ag, and the
device shares its ad ID, the adversary’s strategy is simply patience: wait for each user to
not use the VPN on any app. Figure 2.16 shows the CDF of the delay between when we
observed a device on a VPN and when it was observed on a clearnet IP. Half of the devices
are observed within 12 days, and 16% within 5 days. About a third of the devices were not
seen on a clearnet IP within 26 days.
1To be clear, we did not identify users beyond an ad ID, nor did we identify what torrents were shared.
We did not share any data with investigators.
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Figure 2.16: CDF of time it takes to nd user on clearnet.
2.6.2.2 Clearnet Identication using Location
ere is no readily apparent reason for torrent apps to require a user’s geographic
location. However, many torrent apps do request location access, and among the devices
that shared their ad ID, 68% reported precise, 6-digit GPS coordinate at least once in re-
sponse to our impressions. ese GPS values must be explicitly allowed by users before
the app shares with the SSP, DSP, and advertisers.
Using this information, we performed a post hoc analysis of geofenced retargeting of
68% of ad IDs seen on the VPN. For each ad ID, we determined the maximum radius of a
geofence that would nd the same device on a clearnet IP address. is result is shown
in Figure 2.17. About 30% of the devices can be located within 10 meters of the location
they reported while on the VPN; and about 60% within 1 km.
We also ran an auxiliary experiment to get a sense of real costs. We operated a cam-
paign for one day that targeted BitTorrent apps in two major cities, without ad ID restric-
tions. By spending less than $7 on ads, we were able to re-discover 63 of the ad IDs from
the VPN data set on clearnet IPs.
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Figure 2.17: e maximum radius of a geofenced re-target to determine the clearnet IP
address of a device seen torrenting on a VPN.
2.7 Discussion
Proposed privacy-preserving solution
In-app ads are small, ephemeral messages. While caching these items may save band-
width if the same ad is called again, remaining unmarked may be worth a lot more to the
user. To defend against mark and retarget, all web storage and caches that are used for
advertising should be disabled when Limit Ad-Tracking is enabled.
If all storage and caching methods are disabled, aackers could only track users with
ngerprinting techniques. ese methods are stochastic, and do not guarantee that the
device is the same.
Obfuscating the IP address and precise GPS location will reduce the risk of compro-
mising an ad ID. To prevent precise location targeting, one could use a dierentially pri-
vate [19] obfuscation to continue allowing advertisers to target location while making it
more dicult to target single people.
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Existing RTB conditions that preserve privacy
Some advertising networks take actions that protect the privacy of users. For exam-
ple, we encountered SSPs who ran JavaScript to pre-render an ad-image on a server and
overlay that with a watermark; while this was likely not done specically to protect user
privacy, it did prevent users from being properly marked. We were able to detect instances
of this happening by looking at the IP address, exchange, marks, and ad ID.
Apps and SSPs also try to protect the user to some degree. Some SSPs masked the
last octet of the IP address to protect the user. While this alone does not prevent user
identication, it does make users more expensive to target. Most apps, even ones that
request location permission, do not pass precise location on to advertisers. Finally, some
apps require users’ explicit consent for personalized advertising before passing the ad ID
to advertisers.
How users can preserve privacy in existing mobile operating systems
In current systems, users can reset their identiers manually on a regular basis, and
disable it if possible. When identiers are reset, app cache and data should also be reset
before the app is used again. IP address was the most eective targeting feature. To
prevent easy retargeting, users could browse through the cellular network, or use a VPN
over WiFi, though it is not always practical.
How app developers can preserve user privacy
We tested the eect of dierent Java methods in disabling various marking strategies.
We found that Android developers who want to disable all marking capabilities must pe-
riodically call WebStorage’s deleteAllData to delete HTML5 storage data, and Cook-
ieManager’s removeAllCookies to delete cookies [8]. ey may also completely dis-
able some, but not all marking features: WebStorage’s setDomStorageEnabled and
setDatabaseEnabled, and CookieManager’s setAcceptCookie methods aect
LocalStorage, Web SQL, and HTTP Cookies respectively. However, these laer methods
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do not aect IndexedDB, which must be cleared using deleteAllData. Developers on
iOS may follow a similar procedure discussed in [10].
Study limitations
Using a DSP allowed us to perform evaluations from the perspective of an aacker.
is means we are prone to variations in quality of service. JavaScript sometimes fails,
perhaps because the user exits an app while the ad is loading. Additionally, using a DSP
to conduct this study allowed us a holistic view of the aack, but as this data is collected
through a third party, there are no guarantees of randomness; we balance out known
biases by collecting data using a variety of campaign parameters.
For marking, we do not look at stochastic methods. Bytecode caches store the parsed
JavaScript to enable faster processing. It may be possible to infer the load time of a script
to see if it has been previously compiled and cached [100]. We did not pursue any user
inference methods (such as IP, usage paerns, etc.) to verify user identity, since marking
was highly eective, and users generally used few apps. However, these techniques could
allow advertisers to track users between apps, without an ad ID.
Human Subjects
e protocols used for gathering data were reviewed and approved by our Institutional
Review Board, under protocols (redacted for double-blind review). e IRB determined
that the lack of PII in the study, the diculty in obtaining informed consent, and the low
risk of harm to subjects, did not necessitate obtaining informed consent.
2.8 Related work
Our work is related to several papers on RTB networks. None examine the accuracy
of retargeting devices using marks (only ad IDs) and none examine devices masked by
VPNs.
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Corner et al. [33] quantied the accessibility over time of devices to RTB advertisers,
and measured features such as IP-based geolocation accuracy and bandwidth. ey found
that at least 14% of the population were accessible within a geo-targeted area, and found
that IP-based geolocation services are generally inaccurate. (Our retargeting methods rely
on geolocation consistency, rather than accuracy.) ey examined device ngerprints
based on features, which resulted in an accuracy of less than 50%, even if IP address is
provided; our method results in zero false positives. Corner and Levine [32] explore the
mobile advertising as a means of large scale scientic experimentation, quantifying the
availability of sensors, and the willingness of users to click an ad to participate in an
experiment.
Vines et al. [108] estimated the cost to track a single user using its ad ID. ey used a
DSP to track users’ specic locations, behaviours, and routines. ey tracked ten devices,
measuring win rates, location targeting accuracy, and found that GPS (not IP) geolocation
targeting was accurate and had a low update latency. eir study also included a survey
of 21 DSPs and their features; the majority of them supported HTML ads, and device and
location targeting. In contrast, our study quanties the overhead cost of tracking when
an ad ID is unavailable or reset. Also related is work by Olejnik et al. [86], who measured
the cost to reveal users’ browsing history through ad placements, and Bashir et al. [22]
who gathered 35,000 impressions and modeled information ow between ad exchanges.
Both studies quantify browsing privacy lost to advertising on websites; in contrast, our
focus is on mobile apps.
In 2010, Eckersley [43] performed the rst large-scale study of browser uniqueness us-
ing Java and Flash ngerprinting. However, these features are not available in mobile ads,
and are largely obsolete in modern browsers. e marking aspect of this work is closely
related to research in evercookies [69] and browser ngerprinting techniques. Gomez-Boix
et al. [54] looked at many of these browser features, including font lists, canvas nger-
printing, and user-agent, and found that 33.6% of browsers were unique among 2 million
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users. Cao et al. [27] looked at canvas features and re-identied 1900 users with 99% ac-
curacy. While these features are more available, they rely on hardware uniqueness and
do not work well on mobile devices; mobile device hardware is much more homogeneous
than computer hardware.
Phone ngerprinting has been studied to a limited extent, mostly at a smaller scale.
Some studies look at ngerprinting techniques available to web and app developers that
use additional device information or sensors. Das et al. [36] look at accelerometer and
gyroscope and nd some entropy among 63 mobile devices. ese features are based on
ne hardware dierences between the inertial measurement units on devices; we were not
able to replicate the results in preliminary studies using ads. Zimmeck et al. [122] look
at cross-device tracking using 126 user-disclosed web histories and IP addresses, showing
that both history and IP are eective in linking users’ mobile and desktop usage. Finally,
Smith et al. [100] look at bytecache timing aacks to sni the history of a device. We
could not replicate these results using ads due to the possibility of geing banned by the
DSP.
Work by Ikram et al. [64] and Perta et al. [90] on security for VPN users is complemen-
tary to ours. Both focused on vulnerabilities and exposures present in the client soware
itself, such as the presence of malware and leakage of IPv6 trac. Our results would hold
even if the client soware had no issues.
2.9 Concluding Remarks
We demonstrated that advertisers can re-identify devices on RTB networks even when
users have taken steps to prevent it, such as disabling the device ad ID or using a VPN. We
have shown that advertisers can take advantage of the permissive conguration of web
views to place long-lasting marks on the device, retarget groups of devices using device
proles, and then re-identify the original device within that group. We nd that at least
68% of the impressions from these devices can be re-identied without an ad ID if the
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aacker had a large advertising budget. For less than $5 per day, we could rediscover a
device with 49% success, compared with using an ad ID, over one month. User privacy
can be increased if OS developers disable web view storage by default, or give API access
to disallow storage and caching within advertising web views.
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CHAPTER 3
USING THROUGHPUT TO DEDUCE USER LOCATION
3.1 Overview
When users place a phone call or download data over the Internet, the other party
can make inferences about the user’s location simply by looking at the quality of the
connection. For example, you can oen tell when someone you are calling is driving and
entering a tunnel.
In this chapter, I quantify the extent to which a remote aacker, including app and
web services, can deduce location without the user’s permission. is work, published
in PETS (2013) [102] and TMC (2019) [103], was conducted in collaboration with Joydeep
Biswas, Erik Learned-Miller, Brian Levine, Mark Liberatore, and Hamed Soroush. To study
this problem, we conducted a simulated aack wherein we deduced a user’s travelled path
while streaming data the mobile device, and watched changes in the connection quality.
e remote aacker discussed throughout this chapter could potentially be anyone
running a server that is accessed by a user. Even the advertisers studied in Chapter 2,
who run an ad server and receive location and IP information, could aempt a similar
aack on a large scale. ey can implement this aack by running video ads which can
last up to 30 seconds and are 2–10 MB.
3.1.1 Main results
We were interested in a subset of the Internet-based remote localization problem: Can
an aacker, providing an Internet-based sevice to a mobile user who has disabled geolocation
features, infer the path taken by the mobile user from among a limited set of paths, using
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only information visible at the server? We evaluated this issue on both a larger scale (tens
of miles) and smaller scale (less than 3 miles).
Our analysis showed statistically dierent throughput means among small geographic
areas (0.9 km2 each). Phones that move between locations travel through consistent and
distinct network conditions that are remotely observable. We leveraged these dierences
in our design of several classiers.
Our best performing approach, the NB-KDE classier, can correctly determine the
path taken by the phone from one of four longer paths to neighboring suburbs with greater
than 90% accuracy, and the path and direction (8 classes) with 76% accuracy. In a separate
experiment involving data collected only from within a 4km2 area, in and around our
campus, the same approach could identify direction and which part of campus the user
was traveling with 76% accuracy.
3.1.2 Chapter outline
In Section 3.3 I dene the Internet-based remote localization problem and demonstrate
for the rst time that cellular phones can be remotely localized based on the quality of an
Internet connection. I then describe our data collection methodology in Section 3.5, and
discuss some properties of our dataset. In Section 3.6, I detail three classiers: a k-nearest
neighbors (k-NN) classier, which trains on the ordered sequence of throughput values
of each route, a hidden Markov model (HMM) classier, which exploits the consistency
in throughput values at each location, and a naive Bayes (NB-KDE) classier that uses
kernel density estimation of throughput at each second along a path.
In Section 3.7, I examine the performance of the three classiers, demonstrating that
the k-NN, HMM and NB-KDE approaches can distinguish between a small number of geo-
graphic routes taken by mobile users using only throughput measurements. We examined
two dierent scenarios: a user traveling to a dierent town from campus (or the reverse
direction); a user traveling within our campus. Finally, in Section 3.8 I examine the limita-
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tions of these techniques. We determined the limits on the amount of data and the length
of the trace required to achieve a certain accuracy. ese limits provide a starting point
for the development of a defense.
3.2 Background on streaming
Streaming data typically works in two dierent ways. First is the User Datagram Pro-
tocol (UDP), typically used for livestreams or phone calls. e data sent has no quality
guarantee; if audio is dropped for any reason, it is never recovered, and the user hears
noise or silence.
e second streaming method is Transfer Control Protocol (TCP), which guarantees
that data is transferred completely. Most multimedia streaming services such as Spotify
use TCP. In guaranteeing that data is transmied successfully, and to measure current
network conditions, the sender receives an acknowledgement (ACK) to each data packet
sent. is allows the aacker to remotely monitor connection quality.
In Internet services, the variation in connection quality is typically caused by the “last
mile” problem: the last mile of a connection is the most unpredictable in quality. In cellular
systems, this occurs in the broadcasting of radio waves between a cell phone tower and a
mobile device. Many factors inuence the last mobile mile. Chiey, these factors are the
distance from cell towers, occlusions such as buildings and trees, the individual radios of
the tower and device, and even weather. Both the network layer and link layer 1 contains
mechanisms to correct dropped data. e TCP throughput (i.e. data bandwidth) is directly
aected by these corrections; the more retransmissions required, the slower the overall
connection.
e aack I present here takes advantage of the fact that cell towers and occlusions
are generally geographically static. If a mobile user travels down a well-studied road, the
1see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI model for more information on communication
layers
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aacker could match the changes in throughput to information about the typical connec-
tion disruptions that happen on that road.
is scenario in which the aacker is a server far away from the user is called a remote
localization aack.
3.3 Attacker model
e aacker is a proprietor of a web service that sends data to a device that is in motion,
and aempts to deduce the user’s location without permission. e aacker is either the
remote end-point of the target’s communication, as is the case for TCP-based streaming
services such as Spotify, Pandora, and many others, or has access (perhaps unauthorized)
to network-level metadata along the network path between the end-point and the user.
We assumed that the carrier, who can localize the mobile node by examining the cell
towers to which it has associated, is not assisting the aacker. e aacker does not have
access to any of the internal cellular infrastructure, and cannot geolocate the user using
the carrier-assigned IP address [21]. (I discussed the geolocatability of both cellular and
non-cellular IP addresses in Section 2.5.3.1 of the previous chapter).
e aacker need only passively monitor the throughput on its local server as it
streams data to the user. Our aacker uses only throughput measurements of the tar-
get’s data stream and not the content, which could be encrypted or otherwise unavailable
— though we do assume the aacker could link ows if the remote end-point IP address
changes.
We look at two dierent scenarios in our experiments. First, we evaluate a scenario
where the aacker knows the user’s starting or ending location. is is possible if one
of the user’s adjacent connections are geolocatable. For example, a user starting at home
or work is likely to be connected to the Internet through WiFi using an IP addressed
assigned by their landline/non-cellular ISP. e aacker could also determine a user’s
home location from another source, such as billing information. In our second scenario,
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we assume that the aacker does not know the endpoint, but does know a user’s coarse
location. In both experiments, we assume that the aacker knows that the user is taking
one of a few explicit paths.
ese assumptions are widely applicable. Not only are TCP-based audio and video (i.e.,
music and movies) streaming apps are commonly used, but any installed app with network
access could also initiate data transfers from a server without the user’s knowledge. Even
a web page could stream data to a mobile browser, (e.g. using JavaScript) in some cases
in the background. We found this background connection could be kept alive for ve
minutes on Android, using the Chrome browser, but not on iOS.
3.4 Approach
Our approach builds models of the eects of mobility upon network trac, and uses
these models to determine the mobility of users. Specically, the aacker compares a
trace of network trac generated by a mobile user against a set of models representing
specic paths through a targeted geography. e aacker creates these models by gath-
ering information about TCP’s performance on a set of possible routes that he assumes
the target may take. e aacker may gather this information, which consists of traces of
network trac, during any period when the trac observed would be similar — it need
not be done strictly prior to the aack. is training information may be gathered from
other users that have not disabled GPS. We conjecture that greater temporal locality will
improve the aacker’s performance, though we did not explicitly test this assumption.
We collected hundreds of throughput traces and quantied their correlation with ge-
ography. en we designed classiers based on these correlations, and evaluated them
against our datasets.
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Figure 3.1: For the ‘metro’ dataset, we gathered data on four popular paths in our area, in
two directions for each path. All paths intersect in Amherst, MA, labeled as “X”. For the
‘campus’ dataset, data was collected along the campus gure-eight bus loop around the
University of Massachuses campus, which runs in both directions. We compared both
directions of paths along the West (“E”–“F”) and East (“G”–“H”).
3.5 Data Exploration
We collected 407 measurements of mobile phones traveling around campus and to
nearby towns, illustrated in Figure 3.1. Two hundred eighty-six of those traces — the
metro dataset — were on paths to and from a central location to four remote locations,
each about 25 minutes away (roughly a 360 km2 area). One hundred twenty-one of those
traces — the campus dataset — were on paths encircling a central location around a 4 km2
area. We also collected 29 stationary traces to serve as a simple baseline to contrast the
eect of motion on throughput changes.
Signal strength and throughput characteristics are tied to geography. To explore this
relationship, we discretize geographic data into square areas of varying granularity (see
Figures 3.4 and 3.5). In our rst data set, the mean throughputs of 95% of 1 km2 areas are
statistically dierent from at least 90% of the other areas. In our second dataset, which
cover a smaller area, the mean throughputs of 85% of 0.01 km2 areas are dierent from
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Route Distance
(mi)
Num.
Traces
Collected
roughput
(KB/s)
mean ± s.d.
Duration
(min)
mean ± s.d.
A-to-X 7.0 63 157.4 ± 115.2 16.1 ± 4.2
B-to-X 21.2 24 63.4 ± 94.9 30.5 ± 4.8
C-to-X 10.5 29 116.5 ± 111.4 34.8 ± 7.4
D-to-X 8.5 19 34.6 ± 64.4 36.1 ± 5.1
X-to-A 7.0 68 134.8 ± 110.0 16.4 ± 4.3
X-to-B 21.2 28 47.1 ± 81.3 33.6 ± 9.0
X-to-C 10.5 31 120.1 ± 109.4 32.1 ± 7.8
X-to-D 8.5 24 45.0 ± 76.1 34.9 ± 10.3
E-to-F 2.6 57 142.9 ± 117.4 9.0 ± 9.3
F-to-E 2.6 76 126.2 ± 122.4 7.8 ± 11.2
G-to-H 2.8 53 206.7 ± 154.0 11.7 ± 4.6
H-to-G 2.8 56 194.5 ± 148.1 12.8 ± 4.5
Stationary 0 29 206.6 ± 122.5 20.4 ± 5.5
Figure 3.2: Details of the traces in our Measurement Sets. Leers refer to landmarks
labeled in Figure 3.1. In total, we recorded 407 mobile and 29 stationary traces.
at least 85% of other areas. e implication is that the route traveled by a mobile node
is through a largely unique sequence of mean throughputs that is classiable. Figure 3.2
illustrates these dierences in throughputs.
3.5.1 Data Collection Methodology
We recorded traces2 of GPS location and signal strength using four Android cell phones.
A server in our building streamed music continuously to the phones during measurement
trials, while TCP traces were logged at the server. We later combined sets of correspond-
ing phone and server traces, synchronized using the timestamps within the traces. Note
that it is impossible without carrier participation to take measurements within the net-
work. Moreover, our goal is to assess a weaker aacker who is without special access
to cellular infrastructure, but who can take measurements at an end host. We used Sam-
sung Nexus S, Samsung Galaxy S, Motorola Atrix, and HTC Inspire phones, all connected
2Traces from our experiments are available for download from http://traces.cs.umass.edu.
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to the AT&T UMTS (3G) network, to record traces. e 802.11 radio on the phone re-
mained powered o during the experiments. We collected the data under varying trac
and weather conditions.
We took three sets of traces:
• Mobile 3G Measurement Set — ‘Metro’: We collected data during a one-month
period. Each measurement was taken as a phone traveled along one of four routes
going either toward or away from our central location (point X in Figure 3.1). e
individual paths are shown on a map in Figure 3.1 and summary statistics appear
in Figure 3.2. In total, we recorded 286 traces in this set.
• Mobile 3GMeasurement Set — ‘Campus’: We recorded 141 traces from the same
phones, along one of two directions around a bus loop on campus. Traces were
collected over a period of eight months.
• Stationary 3G Measurement Set — Baseline: We recorded 29 traces from sta-
tionary phones, connected to the UMTS (3G) network, located in dierent locations
near our central location.
e phones collected traces of GPS location (with 10m accuracy) and signal strength.3
Each element of the traces was sampled once per second. Traces of network activity
on the server consist of standard pcap logs. We did not limit traces to periods of cellular
connectivity, and some traces consisted of several TCP connections.
In the mobile sets, we hired several persons to collect data on these specic paths, and
no person was assigned to a single path or phone. Our goal was to avoid learning the
phone model or user behind the movement. Each path diered in distance. In the rst
dataset, each took about 25 minutes on average to travel by car or bus. e travel time
to location A was the shortest and D the longest. In the second dataset, two bus routes
ran bidirectionally in a loop; each cycle took about 45 minutes. We later divided the bus
3As reported by android.telephony.SignalStrength.getGsmSignalStrength().
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loop data into East and West paths (see Figure 3.1). We discuss the implications of path
duration on classier bias in Section 3.7.
Because we relied on a consumer phone platform, on some occasions the experiment
failed because either the end time or start time were not recorded correctly, due to a GPS
failure or write-to-ash failure. We did not aempt to even out the number of traces per
path aer our collection period completed. ough the number of traces per route and
direction varies, we did not alter which traces to collect. In our experiments, we discarded
traces that did not exceed 10 kilobytes transferred (indicating a network error).
3.5.2 Geographic Analysis
We grouped all server-side throughput and client-side signal strength measurements
into small geographic areas (much smaller than and having no correspondence to carrier
cells) to determine if each area had consistent and dierentiable mean throughput. e ef-
cacy of any throughput-based remote localization scheme depends on such consistency.
We found geographic consistency in both cases and a weak correlation between the two
features.
Server-side throughput is inuenced by the wireless link between the phone and cell
tower [29], the network conditions and infrastructure [117] between the phone and server,
the TCP algorithm [88], and other factors. Signal strength is just one factor that inuences
the wireless link but it is the factor with the strongest tie to geography. Received signal
strength is inuenced by many physical features, including occlusions between the radio
and cell tower from tree foliage, the body of the person carrying the phone, buildings, and
other structures. Most of these physical features do not change from one day to the next,
and therefore can have a permanent eect on throughput in a particular area.
We found a weak correlation between client-side signal strength and server-side through-
put of 0.24 when considering mean throughput and mean signal strength on a per-trace
basis. Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of throughput values per signal strength value as
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Figure 3.3: On a per-second basis, the correlation between server-side throughput and
client-side signal strength is 0.24. e plot shows a linear t. Note: Android’s reported
signal strength correlates linearly to decibels, which is a logarithmic measure.
a boxplot. e gure also plots the least-squares linear t of the two variables as a visual
guide. e gure is based on the range of signal strength values measured by the phones.
ese values can be converted to integers, as dened in GSM standard TS 27.007, with 0
referring to −113 dBm or less, 31 referring to −51 dBm or greater. Each value between
1 and 30 is a linear increase from −111 to −53 dBm. We discarded values of 31, as the
unbounded range it captures is too large for a meaningful regression.
Figure 3.4 shows the mean throughput (le) and signal strength (right) of geographic
areas in our measurements of paths to towns (‘metro’ dataset); Figure 3.5 shows the same
information in le and right plots for the smaller measurement area within our campus.
e error bars of each mean indicate the 95% condence interval of the mean. Each plot is
sorted by an increasing mean value, and therefore the order of areas in the plots is not the
same. Using a two-sided, 95% condence interval t-test, we performed a pairwise com-
parison of the mean throughput of the areas. In the ‘metro’ dataset, each cell is on average
signicantly dierent from 85.4% of other cells. In the ‘campus’ dataset, the discretized
areas are smaller (i.e. ner granularity) and there is more similarity, with each cell dif-
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Figure 3.4: e mean throughput (le) and signal strength (right) of geographic areas in
our measurements of paths to surrounding towns. On average, throughput in each cell
is signicantly dierent from throughput in 85.4% of other cells. is data suggests that
latent information linking throughput and geography is available for training a classier.
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Figure 3.5: e mean throughput (le) and signal strength (right) of geographic areas in
our measurements of our ‘campus’ data (a bus traveling within a 4 km2 area). roughput
in each cell is signicantly dierent from throughput in 73.6% of other cells.
49
fering from 73.6% of others. e consistency of these values and the dierences among
areas suggests that latent information linking throughput and geography is available for
training a classier.
e takeaway of the plots is that mobile nodes will travel through a sequence of areas
that has a relatively unique signature of mean throughputs. e task of classication is to
match the observed throughput to a training set that captures these means. In the simplest
approach, we can classify based on the mean throughput that a mobile device obtains from
visiting a series of areas. In three more-advanced approaches, we can classify based on the
per-second mean throughputs of each trace. We evaluate all three approaches, detailed
further in the next section.
3.6 Classiers for Mobile roughput Traces
In this section, we describe several classication algorithms that could be used to iden-
tify which path a mobile phone user is traveling down.
Classiers build models of labeled training instances of data, and use these models to
decide which class an unlabeled test instance belongs to. e instances we considered
were created from packet capture (pcap) les, and the specic data we were interested
in was TCP throughput. We discretized this data into one-second intervals, and treated
each instance as a sequence of per-chunk mean throughputs. With one second chunks,
the index of each throughput value is the time since the start of the trace. Corresponding
GPS coordinates are recorded on a per-second basis as ground truth.
We present a hidden Markov model (HMM) [44], k-nearest neighbors (k-NN), and
naive Bayes (NB-KDE) classier with respect to a motion-throughput model.
Each classier is derived from this model, with dierent assumptions. e HMM clas-
sier is most general, and aempts to maximize the estimated hidden states and transi-
tions. e k-NN and NB-KDE classiers are more rigid, and make the assumption that
users move through a certain path with consistent velocity. e k-NN classier nds k
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Figure 3.6: Locations are represented by hidden states in a hidden Markov model, li. A
user moves from one state to the next with a xed transition probability of 0.7 multiplied
by the probability an observed level of throughput is seen in that state according to the
emission probability vector ei.
of the closest traces by comparing the throughput at each time point of the trace. e
NB-KDE classier determines the distribution of throughputs at each time point for each
path, and nds the most likely trace.
In our evaluation, we tested the identication of a path rather than a sequence of
locations. erefore, we have split the location sequences into separate path classes.
3.6.1 Model
We have a set of discrete locations, L, and a sequence of throughputs b. In general,
we want to associate b with a sequence of locations l0,l1 . . . , where li ∈ L.
In fact, we are trying to match b with the most likely path (or class) c in a set of paths
C . A path c represents the sequence of locations in a path: c = lc0, lc1, . . . .
In order to match a sequence of throughputs b =b0, b1, . . . , we store all observed
throughput at each location in L, and use this information to compute the likelihood
that a location exhibits a certain throughput. We denote the observations at a location l
as ol = ol1, ol2, . . . .
Each classier extends this model. e HMM discretizes L as square cells on a geo-
graphic map. However, the k-NN and NB-KDE classiers assume the location sequences
are traversed at a consistent velocity between traces, so each point in c represents a sin-
gle second along the path. In other words, each class c is expected to be traversed in |c|
seconds, and has a sequence l0...|c|−1.
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3.6.2 HMM
e HMM classier can account for users traveling at variable speed down a path.
However, this is a disadvantage if speed is consistent between traces, since it disregards
timing information. We predicted that an HMM, which does a basic alignment of the data,
would allow us to infer location with ner granularity.
We represent each class as a separate hidden Markov model. Each approximate square
area (as shown in Figure 3.4) is represented by a state l ∈ L. Each state has a set of emission
probabilities — the probability that a certain discrete level of throughput is seen at that
state. We smoothed the observed throughput into sequences of w second windows. e
value of w varies between 3-fold cross validation tests. Based on the resulting sequence,
we compute the likelihood that a certain sequence of states was traversed. We choose the
class that has the highest likelihood as our guess.
e states are xed as approximate square areas on the map. Emission probabilities
at each state are determined by counting the number of occurrences of each throughput
level in the training data in each area and normalizing; see Figure 3.6. Sixteen throughput
levels were represented by e ∈ 0 . . . 15. e probability of a certain throughput level
occurring at a certain location is from a categorical distribution.
In particular location, the probability that an emission level e occurs is
E[p(e|l)] = Count(e)∑
e′ Count(e)
. (3.1)
Following the Markov assumption,
p(l|b) = p(l0|b0)p(l1|b1, l0), p(l2|b2, l1, l0) . . . (3.2)
= p(lt|bt, lt−1) (3.3)
=
∏
t
p(lt|bt, lt−1). (3.4)
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In each sequence, we count the number of transitions between each state, and nor-
malize. e transition from lx to ly is denoted by lx→y, and its probability by p(ly|lx). In
other words, if we are in lx at time t, we determine the probability we are in ly at time
t+ 1:
p(ly|lx) = Count(lx→y)
Count(lx)
. (3.5)
Given both the emission probabilities and transition probabilities of each state, we
can now compute the likelihood of the model given a test sequence (also discretized into
chunks),
p(l|b) =
|b|∏
t=1
p(lt|lt−1)p(bt|lt). (3.6)
We use the log probability,
log p(l|b) =
|b|∑
t=1
log p(lt|lt−1) + log p(bt|lt). (3.7)
We use the Viterbi algorithm [109] to compute this log-likelihood.
We want to determine the most likely class:
argmax
c
log p(c|b). (3.8)
e HMM is the most versatile classier, robust to varying geographical speeds be-
cause it classies based on throughput sequence, and using a sequence to infer not only
path, but location. However, if speed does not typically vary much but is unique to a
certain path, then this classier may be less useful than non-Markov models, since the
former discards this information.
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3.6.3 Sequence-based k-Nearest Neighbor Classier
In the k-NN and NB-KDE classiers, we make an assumption that subjects traveled
along the path at consistent speeds. Instead of considering discrete geographic locations
as we did with the HMM classier, we represent location as equivalent to the number
of seconds a user has traveled along a path. In other words, c = l0, l1, . . . represents a
virtual location for each second along a path, rather than directly mapping to a geographic
location.
First, we compute a distance between the test trace b and training traces btr ∈ Btr.
distance(b,btr) =
|b|∑
t=0
|bt − btrt | (3.9)
Subsequently, we rank the sequences btr by the computed distance from lowest to
highest. We classify the instance as the label (i.e., the route) present in the largest fraction
of the k nearest neighbors. If there is a case of a tie, we increment k for that case until the
tie is broken.
e choice of k tunes a smoothing eect in the data: A larger k reduces erroneous la-
beling due to matching against outliers, while too large of a k can result in simply choosing
the most common training label.
is classier is powerful because it does not try to model any aributes about the
geographic paths — assumptions which may turn out to be incorrect. It simply votes
based on similarity to the labeled traces in the database. However, its accuracy depends
on there being enough training traces to properly match the unknown trace.
3.6.4 Naive Bayes with a sequence of kernel density estimators
e NB-KDE classier makes a similar assumption to the k-NN classier and assumes
that subjects are traveling at consistent speeds. e algorithm obtains a distribution of
throughputs for each location state, and nds the closest matching sequence of distribu-
tions to the observed throughputs.
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Similar to k-NN, c = l0,l1, . . . represents seconds along the path; thus, we do not
consider transitions.
We wish to determine
argmax
c
p(c|b). (3.10)
Each location is associated with a kernel density estimator, with Gaussian kernel K :
f(b|l) = 1
Nl
Nl∑
i=0
K(b− bli). (3.11)
We use the KDE to estimate the likelihood of a certain bandwidth at a location, so
p(bt|lt) = f(bt|lt). (3.12)
We consider each second as independent features in the naive Bayes algorithm. We
compute the likelihood of a class c by multiplying the likelihood at each second, and
choosing the most likely class.
argmax
c
p(c|b) = argmax
c
|c|∏
t=0
f(bt|lct ) (3.13)
A kernel density estimator captures the varying distributions of throughputs at each
location, as well as cases where there may be more than one distribution of throughputs
at a location (for example, if the location is serviced by more than one possible cell tower).
In other words, unlike the k-NN, it does not require every throughput sequence scenario
to be captured in the training traces; rather, it measures the distributions at each second.
By learning this information, the classier performs much more accurately than the other
two classiers.
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Path Classes NB-KDE k-NN HMM roughput Frequency
A-to-X vs stationary 2 100.0 97.7 67.8 65.2 68.5
B-to-X vs stationary 2 100.0 92.2 45.1 86.8 54.7
C-to-X vs stationary 2 100.0 96.5 49.1 74.1 50.0
D-to-X vs stationary 2 100.0 93.8 39.6 87.5 60.4
X-to-A vs stationary 2 100.0 93.3 68.9 69.1 70.1
X-to-B vs stationary 2 100.0 96.3 48.1 89.5 50.9
X-to-C vs stationary 2 100.0 93.0 49.1 83.3 51.7
X-to-D vs stationary 2 100.0 94.1 43.1 77.4 54.7
E-to-F vs stationary 2 68.6 72.5 47.1 60.5 66.3
F-to-E vs stationary 2 68.9 64.4 37.8 76.2 72.4
G-to-H vs stationary 2 87.0 60.9 58.0 54.9 64.6
H-to-G vs stationary 2 96.2 74.4 64.1 56.5 65.9
Figure 3.7: Classication accuracy for dierentiating stationary vs. mobile users. Bolded
entries have the highest accuracy; also bolded are entries that are not statistically dier-
ent from the highest rate (two-sided, two-sample proportion test; 95% c.i.) e NB-KDE
classier performs awlessly for the “metro” traces.
3.7 Experimental Results
We evaluate several scenarios against the classiers described in Section 3.6. Below,
we describe these scenarios with respect to our aacker model, and then discuss the lim-
itations of our classiers in dierent situations.
Summary of Experiments and Results. First, we show that an aacker can dieren-
tiate a mobile user from a stationary user, that is, make the binary choice of mobile or
stationary. e aack succeeds with very high accuracy (100% in the metro dataset for
NB-KDE). Next, we show that given a user’s starting or ending location and choice of
four paths, an aacker can determine which path a user traveled, that is, it can choose the
origin or destination correctly among four suburbs. is aack also succeeds with high
accuracy (83.0–93.0% for NB-KDE depending on the scenario).
We then use our data to explore how well our method will scale to more choices. We
show that given just the choice of four paths, an aacker can determine both the path
and direction traveled (from among the eight possibilities) with good accuracy (75.7% for
NB-KDE). is problem parallels the problem of choosing from one of eight known paths
56
given a starting or ending point, but is no easier: when forced to determine both path
and direction, the aacker is choosing among paths where pairs are quite similar in some
respects (since they are essentially mirror images of one another). We also show that in
our data, the mirroring accounts for some drop in accuracy, though it is less pronounced
in the NB-KDE classier.
Finally, we show that an aacker can identify a user’s path with a ne granularity,
determining the direction and path of travel within campus with high accuracy (76.5% for
NB-KDE and 81.1% for k-NN).
3.7.1 Overview
Our experiments take the form of classication problems, where an aacker trains a
classier on data consisting of labeled sequences of throughput as training instances, as
described in Section 3.6, and aempts to determine the class of an unlabeled test instances.
Varying the classier and training and testing data allow us to determine how well the
aacker can perform under dierent scenarios.
Classiers. We evaluate an aacker’s accuracy using the k-nearest neighbor, naive Bayes
KDE (NB-KDE), and throughput-based HMM classiers described in Section 3.6. We also
evaluate two simplistic approaches to classication. In the rst simplistic approach, called
roughput, the classier models each path as the mean of the mean of the throughputs
associated with each path. is is among the simplest approaches to modeling a path that
actually uses observed throughputs. In the other simplistic approach, called Frequency, the
classier simply chooses the class that was most common in the training data. Performing
no beer than either simplistic approach, which use no information from the data stream,
implies that a classier models the situation poorly.
In all experiments, we use the standard denition of accuracy for a multi-class prob-
lem: the sum of correct classications divided by the total number of classications. We
determined optimal parameters for each classier in separate training sets using 3-fold
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Figure 3.8: e empirical CDF of server-side roundtrip time (RTT) estimates for long-
running TCP connections when a mobile device is static or moving. e same device
is used for both cases. e static scenario demonstrates a noticeably dierent distribu-
tion of estimated RTTs compared to the mobile scenario; RTT is a primary factor in TCP
throughput [88].
Data Set Experiment Classes NB-KDE k-NN HMM roughput Frequency
Metro
4 paths× 1 (Outward) 4 92.0 52.9 29.7 48.3 45.0
4 paths× 1 (Inward) 4 93.0 47.3 69.8 48.9 46.7
4 paths × 2 8 83.0 35.6 11.5 26.6 23.8
Campus 2 paths × 2 4 76.5 81.1 43.2 48.8 31.4
Figure 3.9: Classication accuracy depending on which roads are included in the exper-
iment. Bolded entries are not signicantly less accurate than the most accurate result.
Outward indicates “X”-to-. . . , and inward indicates the opposite. Traces were truncated
to 10 minutes long.
cross-validation. ese were the value of k for the k-NN, the bandwidth selection method
(Silverman’s [99] or Sco’s Rule [97]) for the NB-KDE, or the window sizew for the HMM.
Using these parameters within the held-out test set, testing and training was done using
leave-one-out cross-validation. We evaluate the named classiers themselves, not any of
the specic parameters.
Assumptions and Limitations. Our aacker model and assumptions are described in
Section 3.3. Our techniques assume the aacker knows the starting (or ending) location
of the user. We assume the aacker has trained on all possible paths the user could have
taken from (or to) that location.
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Our measurement study is limited to one geographic location that is a small town with
few tall buildings, as well as several paths to surrounding towns. Other small cities may
be dierent, and cities replete with tall buildings may have very dierent characteristics.
e speed of the mobile node was dictated by local trac. We have no data on walking
or bicycling targets.
We used Subsonic4 to stream a constant bitrate mp3 from our server to the phone, re-
seing the cache before each run. However, a real target might not stream data the entire
length of the path (or at all), and hence we gave the aacker an advantage. Further, we
did not model the complexities of commercial streaming services, which may not stream
from a single location on the network. Finally, our measurements do not include any com-
peting trac ows to or from the phone during trace collection, which may complicate
classication in practice.
3.7.2 Dierentiating Stationary and Mobile Users
In our rst experiment, we compare our instances of data from stationary phones
against those from mobile phones. In this set of experiments, all stationary traces are
one class, and mobile traces corresponding to each of the routes shown in Figure 3.1 are
treated as the other class. e results are shown in Figure 3.7. We see that the NB-KDE
classier works perfectly, and the k-NN classier is near perfect. Both are noticeably
beer than simply comparing raw throughput information. As we show in Figure 3.8,
there are obvious dierences in RTT estimates, and RTT is a prominent factor in TCP
throughput [88]. Dramatic variations of the estimated RTT are likely the result of the
increased number of local link-layer retransmissions, which seek to mitigate the impact
of wireless losses on TCP [29]. ese retransmissions are more common in our mobile
scenarios.
4http://www.subsonic.org
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Data Set Experiment Classes NB-KDE k-NN HMM roughput Frequency
Metro
A-to-X vs X-to-A 2 88.3 61.4 33.3 61.1 51.9
B-to-X vs X-to-B 2 96.8 62.6 43.5 57.7 53.8
C-to-X vs X-to-C 2 94.3 66.5 29.6 50.0 51.7
D-to-X vs X-to-D 2 95.5 63.8 90.2 67.4 55.8
Campus E-to-F vs F-to-E 2 88.4 55.1 78.3 63.2 57.1H-to-G vs G-to-H 2 99.0 82.3 74.0 59.6 51.4
Figure 3.10: e NB-KDE was able to dierentiate between directions for most paths.
e exception was “X-to-D” which was relatively symmetrical. Bolded entries are not
signicantly less accurate than the most accurate result.
3.7.3 Determining a User’s Path
In our next set of experiments, we assume that the user’s starting or ending location
is known, and that our goal is to determine which of four paths were taken by the device.
In these experiments, we truncated each trace to the rst ten minutes to avoid biases
introduced by the varying trace length between each class. In the metro situation, we
train and test classiers using only traces that are Inward to the central location (“. . . to
X”) described in Section 3.5; then we do so again, using only Outward (“X to . . . ”) traces.
Each set of these experiments considers four classes. We also classied path and direction
(8 classes). e results of these experiments are shown in Figure 3.9.
e NB-KDE and classier signicantly outperform the naive classiers. e HMM
does not work when there is a time-independent sequence of throughputs that are similar
between two paths. is is particularly the case for paths X-to-C and X-to-A, which are
both paths away from the more urban location X. If the value of k is tuned, the classier
achieves greater than 70% accuracy [101]; however, it does not perform well if k is chosen
using a separate training set. Figure 3.12 shows the confusion matrix of the NB-KDE
results. It misclassied the “A-to-X” path direction particularly oen, indicating that the
rst and last ten minutes of this path are relatively symmetrical.
In the campus situation, both the k-NN and NB-KDE performed well. As shown in
Figure 3.12, e NB-KDE classier oen misclassied the “F-to-E” as “H-to-G”; these are
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both south-to-north paths, which go from low-throughput to high-throughput. In both
cases, the HMM performed poorly because while it may be able to learn the sequence
of throughputs associated with each path and direction, it discards all timing informa-
tion. Upon further analysis of the guessed states, there were many cases where the HMM
assumed that the subject traveled either exceptionally quickly or slowly.
As we discussed in Section 3.5, the reason classication is possible is that throughput
is geographically consistent in our dataset (see Figure 3.4). e experiments in this section
demonstrate that path-level classication can make meaningful use of such consistency.
In line with our intuition, we nd that naive measurements of throughput alone does not
adequately dierentiate routes, but classiers perform signicantly beer.
We found a positive correlation of 0.15 between throughput and trace, shown in Fig-
ure 3.3. e lower correlation — compared to a correlation of 0.24 at the per-second level
— speaks to the challenge of this task: network performance is generally consistent for
a path but it weakens signicantly for shorter time scales. Additional features from the
network trac are likely needed to advance classication accuracy to work with ner
time scales or geographies. Mobile usage paerns may also be useful in accounting for
variances between traces [67]. A non-Markovian hidden state model [68] may be able to
account for varying speeds, while still preserving timing information that is consistent
within a class.
Determining direction given a path. As Figure 3.10 shows, the NB-KDE is best able
to classify the direction given a path. e NB-KDE performs well because it dierentiates
the unique seconds along a path in each direction. Occasionally, the HMM does well: it
benets from the duration and length of both directions in each class being similar, thus
it is unlikely to incorrectly infer a class due to misalignment. As well, the general trend
of throughput decreasing in the “X-to-. . . ” metro traces, or north-to-south campus traces
is easily modeled. e k-NN sometimes fails by erroneously matching the middle of each
path, which are likely consistent in both directions.
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Figure 3.11: We analyzed trace length vs accuracy to evaluate the ecacy of the aack if
a connection session length is limited. e le graph indicates the campus experiment,
and the right graph indicates the 8-class metro experiment (Figure 3.9 indicates the results
at 600 seconds). e HMM performs poorly in both cases because it confuses classes in
which similar sequences, regardless of timing, occur. is was particularly true among
the outgoing paths in the metro data.
3.7.4 Eect of trace duration on accuracy
A potential target may wish to protect her privacy by limiting her session length. We
investigate the accuracy of each classier, given dierent trace lengths.
Figure 3.11 shows the accuracy the classiers given trace durations of 1–600 seconds.
All three classiers classify the campus paths more accurately when traces are longer.
Most traces were classied within ve minutes. In the 8-class metro experiment, the NB-
KDE far surpassed the accuracy of the two other classiers at all lengths. e HMM
did not work in this case — wide variations in throughput of all traces strongly biased
the classier towards one class (i.e., path). e k-NN classier improved linearly with
trace length. e NB-KDE notably could identify traces with approximately 60% accuracy
within one minute. is indicates that even short connection sessions may be enough to
reveal information about a person’s location.
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Figure 3.12: Confusion matrices for the NB-KDE classier in the corresponding campus
and metro experiments for 600 seconds.
3.8 Discussion
3.8.1 Approaches to Enhancing Privacy
Besides limiting trace duration, we did not test any approaches for enhancing the
privacy of users against this aack, but many existing techniques are likely to be eective.
To prevent revealing their travel paths to nosy remote servers, phone users will need
to trac shape or otherwise perturb their data transmission, incurring a performance
penalty.
For example, a trusted proxy located outside the cellular network can re-shape trac
before reaching the aacker. As noted in Section 3.3, we assume the carrier is not assisting
the aacker. e proxy could be set up as a VPN as a trac shapper, which we suggest
not for the encryption but because it is a protocol widely supported by smart phones as a
transparent method of redirecting trac.
It is feasible that the mobile device could reshape the trac on its own. Most simply, it
could limit throughput to a peak level that is reasonable across a wide area of the cell net-
work. Or it could enforce regions of zero throughput. Of course, the challenge is to shape
trac in a way that does not overall reduce throughput or the interactivity needed by the
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application. is type of shaping would be easy for bulk le transfer where perhaps no
interactivity is required. However, trac shaping would be more challenging for interac-
tive audio and video calls, where users are most sensitive to throughput limitations and
network delay jier. Trac shaping of interactive web browsing may also be a challenge,
but caching and pre-fetching may help mask throughput ceilings.
3.8.2 Limitations
e traces we consider are on the order of tens of minutes long, and we also evaluate
how trace length aects accuracy. e user must be traveling at a similar velocity at each
location with limited deviations from a typical training trace. All our measurements were
taken by users riding public buses, except one path where the measurements were taken
from a car. In all cases, the vehicle went at the pace of the road and congested trac, if
any. Finally, our main result relates to selecting a path from limited possibilities rather
than the full set of roads on Earth.
3.9 Related work
Mobile Phone Localization. Precisely localizing mobile phones or other similar de-
vices on the basis of GSM and other location-explicit information is an active area of
research. However, these works use information available only to the mobile user (such
as which 802.11 base stations or cell towers are in range [59,105]) or their carrier (such as
the paern of handos [23] or other administrative details [116]). In our work, we focus
on remotely localizing another party based only on a TCP trac stream rather than local
information.
Kune et al. [77] propose a technique to test if a user is present within a small area or
absent from a large area by simply listening on the broadcast GSM channel. e focus of
their work is on lower layers of the GSM communication stack. We did not extend our
study to analyze lower layers of 3G, because it is a legal violation in our jurisdiction. And
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again, our study is concerned with remote observation of network streams over cellular
links, and largely treats the cellular infrastructure as a black box.
Xu et al. [116] present an approach for localizing performance measurements in 3G
networks. ey exploit the predictability of users’ mobility paern to develop a clustering
algorithm for grouping related cell sectors and assigning IP performance measurements
to ne-grained geographic regions. e proposed technique requires access to the cellular
infrastructure. In contrast, our technique for network-based localization requires remote
passive observation of the target, and data collection independent from the target and
internals of the infrastructure.
Balakrishnan et al. [21] show that individual cell phones can expose dierent IP ad-
dresses to servers within time spans of a few minutes, and nd that IP-based geo-localization
is “impossible” in cellular networks. ey show that application-level latencies can dier
greatly among cities thousands of miles apart. Moreover, they show that the variation of
latencies in short time spans is not high. Our work is complementary and extends similar
notions further: we show the consistency of throughput at the ner granularity of square-
kilometer regions, and we demonstrate successful classication experiments using such
features.
Xu et al. [117] show that in contrast to wired Internet trac, current cellular data traf-
c traverses through a limited number (4–6) of Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSNs),
which is the rst IP hop of a data connection. e authors show that local DNS servers
provide an appropriate approximation to estimate a user’s network location (i.e., one of
the 6 GGSNs) for purposes of mobile content placement and server selection, due to the
restricted routing in cellular networks. By assuming availability of partial information
about the possible routes a user could be on, our approach aims at a much more granu-
lar localization than the DNS method proposed by Xu et al., which is limited to nding
approximate network locations.
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Cellular Network and User Characterizations. An investigation of the performance
of multimedia streaming over cellular networks is presented by Chestereld et al. [31]. e
authors show that the key constraint for the streaming applications is the interactivity
level of the user. We have only considered non-interactive music streaming in this work.
An open problem is extending our aack to other types of applications such as video
streaming and VoIP.
Chan et al. [29] evaluate the impact of variable rate and variable delay on long-lived
TCP streams over 3G wireless links. e authors demonstrate that local retransmission
mechanisms used in cellular deployments to reduce the impact of losses on TCP through-
put and to improve channel utilization come at the expense of increased delay and rate
variability. We show that there are predictable dierences among performances of a cel-
lular network with regards to throughput and delay in dierent geographical locations
that could be used for remote localization purposes.
OtherRemoteAttacks. Kohno et al. [74] present a technique for ngerprinting a phys-
ical device remotely by exploiting clock skews. eir approach could be used to remotely
identify the same device connected to the Internet at dierent times or using dierent
IP addresses. Our approach, which is focused on detecting the routes taken by a mobile
node, is orthogonal to this work and could benet from it when locating the end-points
of a target’s travel path.
NAT and rewall policies of cellular carriers are explored in the work by Wang et
al. [112]. ey identify a set of such policies that directly impact performance, energy,
and security of mobile devices. For instance, they show that NAT boxes and rewalls
set timeouts for idle TCP connections, which sometimes lead to a signicant waste of
energy on the mobile device. e authors show that in spite of the deployment of rewalls,
cellular networks are still vulnerable to denial of service and baery draining aacks. In
contrast, we explore another type of aack on the location privacy of mobile cellular users.
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Perta et al. [91] identify mobile phone IP addreses by sending several PUSH noti-
cations to target devices and measuring round-trip times, assuming the network carrier
assigns public IP addresses. ey exploit variations in the cell network architecture to nar-
row down a user’s IP to about 1000 addresses within 20 messages. is may be enough to
identify coarse grained location information about the user.Remote localization has been
studied in some previous work. Kohno et al. [74] present a technique for ngerprinting
a physical device remotely by exploiting clock skews. eir approach could be used to
remotely identify the same device connected to the Internet at dierent times or using
dierent IP addresses. Our approach, which is focused on detecting the routes taken by
a mobile node, is orthogonal to this work and could benet from it when locating the
end-points of a target’s travel path.
Perta et al. [91] identify mobile phone IP addreses by sending several PUSH noti-
cations to target devices and measuring round-trip times, assuming the network carrier
assigns public IP addresses. ey exploit variations in the cell network architecture to nar-
row down a user’s IP to about 1000 addresses within 20 messages. is may be enough to
identify coarse grained location information about the user.
My work extends these studies by exploiting TCP throughput itself, an aack which
can only be mitigated by articially slowing the user’s connection.
3.10 Concluding remarks
We have demonstrated that the paerns of data transmission between a server on the
Internet and a moving cell phone can reveal the geographic travel path of that phone.
While the GPS and location-awareness features on phones explicitly share this informa-
tion, phone users will likely be surprised to learn that disabling these features does not
suce to prevent a remote server from determining their general mobility. Our work
shows that a naive Bayes classier with sequences of kernel density distributions can
discover and exploit features of the geography surrounding possible travel paths to deter-
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mine the path a phone took, using only data visible at the remote server on the Internet
and training data collected independently.
While we had hypothesized that simpler alignment methods such as dynamic time
warping [26] or hidden Markov models could improve accuracy, these failed because they
discard timing information that is consistent within a path. More complex alignment
such as hidden semi-Markov models [68] may be more of a threat in this regard. If the
aacker has access to much more training information (for example, via a popular mobile
application), they may be able to model a user’s position in 2-D space using a Gaussian
process [51], rather than only along a specic path.
In the present chapter, we have demonstrated that the aack can be successful with
traces that are only one minute long. It is an open and important problem to quantify the
extent to which a user’s location can be compromised in this fashion — with greater ac-
curacy and among larger numbers of paths and dierent geographies — and to determine
just how much information is needed to make these inferences.
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CHAPTER 4
ESTABLISHING A PROTOCOL FOR ANONYMOUS USAGE OF A
CELLULAR NETWORK
4.1 Overview
In the previous two chapters, we examined remote aackers who try to determine
user identity and location over the Internet, and suggested some defenses against these
aacks. In this chapter, I explore the feasibility of continuing to use a mobile network
provider despite not trusting it with identity and location. e naı¨ve solution would be
for users to use a prepaid mobile phone that is not associated with their identity. is is
expensive, and the user identity could be discovered through either trajectory inference
aacks or location proling.
is project, submied to WiSec (2020), was completed in collaboration with Brian
Levine, Mark Liberatore, and Mariya Zheleva. We introduce a protocol, ZipPhone, that
precludes this need for trust between user and service provider. is protocol uses ephemeral
pseudonyms as a method of accessing the network anonymously. Connecting anony-
mously (without a pseudonym) is not viable; users could not be billed for service, and
connected sessions could not be maintained.
e idea behind ZipPhone is for users to purchase and use dierent cell phone iden-
tities several times a day, and change identities when they are in the presence of other
ZipPhone users to prevent the old identity from being linked to the new one. is process
is called “mixing”. For successful mixing, users must remain oine long enough to be
confused with other users, which results in a reduced utility of service.
e main focus of this study was to quantify user privacy in the face of linking and
proling, not to rigorously test the technical details of its implementation. However, we
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did propose a technical implementation, published in MoST (2014) [104], that is compati-
ble with the current cellular infrastructure. e protocol itself is not only compatible with
the current cellular network, but also robust to future methods of connectivity that may
be more decentralized, and evaluate its ecacy.
4.1.1 Main results
We quantied the privacy-utility tradeo for a user who wants to continue using a
phone service anonymously. Since users behave habitually, they are susceptible to location
proling aacks, which match unlabelled sequences of locations to users based on their
historical movement habits.
We simulated a ZipPhone implementation on two mobile call detail record datasets
collected from real users [42, 83]. ese simuations represent small deployments of the
protocol with 100–150 users in the same locale using uncoordinated mix zones. Despite
the small number of users, we show that privacy gains are signicant, especially for users
who are not unique but are highly predictable; a larger deployment would increase privacy
while maintaining each user’s utility and performance. We determined that predictable
users (e.g. ones with a daily routine) are identiable 69% of the time, but could reduce
that to 24% if their location behavior is similar enough to others who also have ZipPhone,
requiring only a 5% sacrice in utility. Additionally, this has a minimal impact on baery
life.
We conclude that it is indeed possible to use a wireless service without trusting it.
4.1.2 Chapter outline
In Section 4.2, I discuss the ideas behind proling and linking, and how ZipPhone
protects against them. To our knowledge, prior work had not analyzed the combination
of both aacks. I also discuss two important user traits related to their geographic be-
haviour: predictability and mixing, which underpin the aainable privacy against these
aacks. e ZipPhone protocol and formal problem statement are stated in Section 4.3. In
70
Figure 4.1: Le: Diverging paths that are regularly taken by two users. During training,
an aacker would encode each labelled transition into a transition matrix for location
proling. Right: Separate, unlabelled activity where an unknown user reconnects using a
new pseudonym at every tower. If the anonymous user does not successfully mix at these
towers (i.e. does not remain oine long enough), the aacker can link the trajectories
together and match the concatenated trace to User B’s prole. Figure 4.2 show examples
of this generated from users in the dataset.
Section 4.3.3, we introduce a sophisticated location privacy aack to reveal the identity of
anonymous cell tower traces. We probabilistically link traces together to more accurately
identify users using knowledge of users’ historical movement paerns. We also describe
a strategy to avoid this reidentication aack.
We evaluate our approach on two data sets collected from real cellular users [42, 83]
in Section 4.4. Finally, in Section 4.5, we discuss how our model ZipPhone protocol can
be employed in emerging mobile cellular networks without explicit cooperation of the
provider. We also estimate the incurred baery use from ZipPhone for 3G and 4G net-
works. Specically, we measured power consumption during network association and
disassociation, and we estimate that a user may incur at most 1% baery overhead per
day regardless of network technology or desired privacy if ZipPhone were used. In Sec-
tion 4.6, we detail the limitations and ethical implications of this study.
4.2 Background
When mobile users connect to the Internet, they authenticate to a cell tower, allowing
service providers such as Verizon and AT&T to store a log of the time, radio tower, and user
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Figure 4.2: e movement of six users throughout a month, and on three weekdays within
that month, produced from a log of tower transitions and the towers’ estimated locations
(each row represents a dierent user). Nodes and edges that are more opaque occurred
with higher frequency. e axes are a consistent latitude and longitude, which have been
redacted out of an abundance of caution to protect the privacy of the users. Each user
displays somewhat routine (predictable) behaviour. However, the boom three users (red,
purple, and brown), who show similar activity, would benet the most from ZipPhone.
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identity [120]. As providers have advanced towards the current h generation of cellular
networks, the density of towers has grown, allowing these logs to capture users’ location
with increasing precision. Many users are persistently connected, apprising providers
of their location all day. Connecting to a large private Wi-Fi network provides similar
information to its administrators. And some ISPs oer cable, cellular, and Wi-Fi hotspots
as a unied package.
Users concerned about their location privacy [20] may use existing tools that allow
protection only at the network and application levels. For example, VPNs and Tor [40]
mask the IP address of a user from a remote server, and hide the remote server location
from the service provider. Additionally, access control features allow users to hide or
reduce location information sent to location-based services. No such tools exist for pro-
tection of geographic locations from local service providers — but that does not mean that
users are complacent about their ISPs having knowledge of their locations. A recent class
action lawsuit demonstrates that mobile users do not want cellular service providers to
sell their historic movement records to third parties, such as location aggregators [28].
To gain privacy, a user u may aempt to anonymously use a wireless service by ob-
taining a mobile identity i1 without revealing personal information. e user may switch
to a new pseudonymous identity, i2, before the rst is compromised, eventually going
through a series of identities over time [25]. In this scenario, two primary aacks prevent
the user from having location privacy, as illustrated in Figure 4.1:
1. in location proling, an aacker identies one or more of the identities i1, i2, . . . as
user u by exploiting the uniqueness of the locations the user is known to regularly
visit.
2. in trajectory linking, an aacker infers that activity by i1 is linked to activity by i2
despite the change in identier. e union of locations can enhance the success of
location proling.
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A real-world demonstration of these transitions are shown in Figure 4.2.
ere is a fundamental location privacy cost to connecting to a mobile service. To re-
duce the success of these aacks without modifying their behaviors, users can (i) switch
identies frequently, and (ii) remain oine for a period of time between connection ses-
sions, which both reduce user utility. In this chapter, we model and quantify this trade-o
between utility and location privacy.
Our work complements existing research in location privacy. Location proling has
been long known to be a problem [38]; aacks typically classify either the set of locations
cells visited by an unlabelled user during a time period, or the list of transitions between
locations [82]. Trajectory privacy studies, including a body of work in VANETs [58, 79],
generally link disconnected traces using Euclidean information. Defenses against these
aacks generally utilize a mixing strategy or, more recently, dierential privacy. While
the laer can separately protect against either location proling or trajectory linking [45,
114, 115], it requires the cooperation of ISPs. In contrast, our work assumes the ISP is an
adversary, and we evaluate robustness against aackers using both proling and linking.
For our analysis, we model defensive strategies as a protocol we call ZipPhone, and we
dene specic ISP-based aacker algorithms as well. We assume a set of users employ
ZipPhone, using ephemeral identiers and go oine to prevent trajectory linking. No-
tably, users do not need to coordinate mixing; naturally occurring mix zones are enough
to signicantly reduce linking success. Our aacker model looks to historical transi-
tion probabilities to model linking, rather than Euclidean distance. Using two real-world
datasets [42, 83], we quantify the path predictability and mixing degree of user activity.
With the same data, we demonstrate how a small community can reduce an aacker’s
re-identication accuracy substantially while sacricing a limited amount of utility.
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4.3 Attacker and Defender Algorithms
Our primary goal is to quantify the privacy-utility trade-os present in systems that
provide geographic anonymity from mobile ISPs. To do so, rst we instantiate a specic
protocol for users and provide well-dened aacker algorithms. e protocol, ZipPhone,
is based on mechanisms available to the user only; i.e., the ISP is not cooperative, an
assumption not shared by many location privacy systems. In short, users can control only
their active identity (i.e. pseudonym) and whether or not they are connected; providers
aempt to link the activities of identities to existing user proles.
4.3.1 Problem Statement
ZipPhone users seek to use the network, but not have their real identities associated
with their mobility traces. Upon joining the network, the user u is assigned a pseudonym
i. e pseudonym lets the user maintain a connection session for some period of time.
e user aaches to a sequence of towers as it moves according to signal strength and
the corresponding hando procedures. By registering as identity i and then moving, the
user provides to the ISP a trace: (i, (s1, s2, . . .)), where each value of s indicates a specic
wireless transceiver and a timestamp. e provider knows the locations of the transceivers
and can, thus, trace a user’s mobility. It is not the goal of the user to hide that they are
using ZipPhone.
e goal of the aacker is to infer and label their identities from the traces. e aacker
is a wireless provider such as a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) that already has a history
of traces for each ZipPhone user. e aacker then tries to determine which user from
a set u1, u2, u3, . . . is the one that created the trace (i, (s1, s2, . . .)) based on a classier
trained from the known history.
In Section 4.4.3, we demonstrate that longer traces are easier to identify and link with
other traces; users should regularly renew their identier in order to keep these traces
short. We assume the user does not perturb their own movement paerns. erefore
75
important parameters are (i) the identity renewal frequency, and (ii) the user’s oine
duration. When the renewal frequency is higher, privacy also increases; but each identity
renewal incurs an oine period and increases power usage. Longer oine durations
improve privacy but reduce utility. We assume all such parameters are public and known
to the aacker.
4.3.2 Attacker Model
We assume the aacker (i) has all traces of all ZipPhone devices, and (ii) has labelled
traces of historic movement for all ZipPhone users in order to train a classier; in other
words, the aacker is a service provider such as a mobile network operator. e aacker
performs trajectory linking, which patches together separate traces if a classier predicts
they are from the same user.
We assume that all ZipPhone users are of equal interest to the aacker, and that it uses
only normal cellular infrastructure to aack. For example, we assume that the aacker
does not install cameras on towers to identify users via facial recognition, nor would they
follow a particular user by car. It does not make sense for the aacker to set up an IMSI
catcher [35] since they already own the entire real infrastructure. We assume that location
accuracy is on the level of cell tower; while features such as RSSI or TDOA could locate
wireless devices with more precision, devices could in turn articially slightly reduce
performance as a defense, eects of which are outside the scope of this study.
We assume that the aacker gains no other information from the users; in mobile
phones, information such as IMEI, device model, or OS signatures, are easily turned o via
OS seings. In practice, such features would assist the aacker (see [34]), but are not the
focus of this research as they are more easily obfuscated or falsied than real geographical
movement. For example, IMEIs, which are akin to a MAC address, can be modied by the
user since she controls the handset hardware (e.g., SilentCircle’s blackphone [6]). Users
are likely identiable by the unique set of outgoing calls they make; however, they can
76
1: utility←Minimum utility between 0.0 and 1.0
2: max o time←Maximum time oine during renewal
3: while device is online do
4: wait(until device moves outside range of tower)
5: disconnect
6: o time← uniform(0,max o time)
7: wait(o time)
8: connect . connect with new identier
9: cooldown time← utility × o time
10: wait(cooldown time)
Algorithm 4.1: User identier renewal strategy (ZipPhone)
make calls via VoIP through an anonymizing proxy or circuit rather than using the cel-
lular carrier. Encryption of the VoIP stream can thwart carrier eavesdropping. Stronger
protection is available by using VoIP over Tor [7].
On the other hand, a user’s reidentiability depends on their predictability and mixing
behaviour. A user who visits vastly dierent location than her peers could not mix easily;
her activity could be easily linked and proled. And a user who is not predictable could
not be easily identied regardless of mixing behaviour.
4.3.3 Attacker-defender dynamics
In this section, we dene the exact algorithms used by the ZipPhone user and the
service provider aacker.
4.3.3.1 User strategy
Algorithm 4.1 denes the ZipPhone user algorithm. As described in the previous sec-
tion, ZipPhone users renew their identiers when: (i) they are in the process of switching
towers, and (ii) the renewal cool down period (in seconds) has expired; (iii) they are not
actively using the phone. To renew, users rst detach, then stay oine, and then reaach
with a new prole. e oine time is selected uniformly at random from a maximum of-
ine period. It must be random, otherwise linking traces would be trivial. e cool down
period ensures that the loss of utility remains at a minimum for the user. is aggressive
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1: function profile user(u) . u is the user index
2: Tu0,q ← Count(q)∑
q′∈C Count(q′)
. e prior for user’s initial location
3: for all p→ q ∈ transitions(u) do . p→ q denotes a transition
4: Tup,q ← Count(p→q)∑
q′∈C Count(p→q′) . is transition matrix may be sparse
5: return Tu
6: function classify user(s) . s = (s0, s1 . . . ), s ∈ C is a sequence of tower IDs
7: return argmaxu Tu0,s0
∏n−2
i=0 T
u
si,si+1
Algorithm 4.2: Location proling algorithm
renewal strategy is frequent enough to allow the natural formation of mix zones, and does
not require users to coordinate times or places to mix.
4.3.3.2 Attacker strategies
e aacker’s goal is to take a timestamped sequence of visited towers and infer the
user, given a training set. We rst describe a location proling classier that could be
employed by the aacker. We then dene a trajectory linking classier to aid the aacker
in trajectory linking.
4.3.3.2.1 Location proling algorithm Our classier (Algorithm 4.2) is a Markov
model that chooses the most likely user for a sequence of tower aaches; the classier
is adapted from Mulder et al. [82]. With this classier, the aacker labels a sequence of
locations with the most likely user, based on all possible users’ transition histories. In our
model, vector s is a sequence of locations in the location set C: s = (s0, s1, s2 . . . ), s ∈ C.
In the steps below, the aacker identies the most probable user given each candidate
user’s history, uˆ = argmaxu p(u|s).
We determine the most likely user, given a sequence of locations.
Pr(u|s) = Pr(u|s0, s1, s2, . . . )
We apply Bayes’ rule, and consider the likelihood of a sequence given a user.
Pr(u|s) = Pr(s0, s1, s2, . . . |u) Pr(u)
Pr(s0, s1, s2, . . . )
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We assume that each user is equally likely.
Pr(u|s) ∝ Pr(s0, s1, s2, . . . |u)
= Pr(s0|u) · Pr(s1|u, s0) · Pr(s2|u, s0, s1)·
Pr(s3|u, s0, s1, s2) . . .
Each transition is independent per the Markov assumption.
= Pr(s0|u)
n∏
i=0
Pr(si+1|si, u)
We determine the most likely user uˆ.
uˆ = argmax
u
Pr(s0|u)
n∏
i=0
Pr(si+1|si, u)
e aacker computes a transition matrix T for each user in the training data by
counting the occurrences of these transitions in history. e probability of the rst loca-
tion in the sequence Pr(s0|u) is computed from the overall number of a user’s occurrence
at a location. e aacker does not consider the probability of a trace ending at a certain
location, since a sequence can end for arbitrary reasons.
e success of such an aack depends on two factors: the number of users in the
anonymous community, and the similarity of the user’s location transitions to the other
users. If there is one registered cell phone user on the network, then linking the user
to location is trivial; however, if there are many users who behave similarly, it would be
dicult for the aacker to tell the user apart.
We also designed and tested a classier that exploited diurnal features of user mobility,
however, it did not perform signicantly beer than the above outlined algorithm. In our
subsequent evaluations, the aacker does not employ diurnal features.
4.3.3.2.2 Trajectory linking algorithm In Algorithm 4.3, we extend Algorithm 4.2
to model the aacker’s ability to do trajectory linking. e aacker uses the transitions
of all users and builds a semi-Markov linking transition matrix. is matrix is similar to
the one described in Algorithm 4.3, except that it is built by considering all subsequent
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1: max t←Maximum time oine during renewal
2: function train link transitions
3: for all p max t−−−→ q do . all locations q seen within max t of p
4: T lp,q ← Count(p
max t−−−→q)∑
q′∈C Count(p
max t−−−→q′) . transition matrix used for linking
5: return T l
6: function classify user with trajectory(s)
7: while link count<max links do
8: candidates←find candidates(s) . traces ≤ max o time aer s ends
9: if empty(candidates) then
10: break
11: sˆ′ ← argmaxs′ T lsn,s′0 . ∀s
′ ∈ candidates
12: s← concatenate(s,s′)
13: return classify user(s)
Algorithm 4.3: Linking algorithm
locations within a given oine time, rather than only the next immediate location. is
strategy ensures that unreasonable transitions do not confuse the classier, and any un-
seen transitions occurring within that time frame are accounted for.
Our trajectory linking algorithm rst searches for candidate traces that start within
the maximum oine time. If a number of traces start within the oine time, the targets
have a chance to mix, and the aacker must infer which trace comes next by using the
semi-Markov transition matrix. is process is repeated until the trace is of sucient
length for classication, or there are no more candidates.
4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we determine the parameters in our model and evaluate the algorithms
using two real-world datasets that contain geotagged user data coupled with tower at-
tachment logs: PhoneLab [83] and RealityMining [42]. First, we characterize the amount
of predictability and mixing behaviour exhibited by users in these datasets. We demon-
strate that both characteristics are related to the success of the aacker’s accuracy. Next,
we simulate a deployment of ZipPhone amongst a community of users, and determine
their reidentiability with respect to sacriced utility.
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Type Trait Privacyhypothesis PhoneLab
Reality
MiningPredictable Mixing
P/M Yes Yes Moderate-Low 18% 18%
P/nM Yes No Low 26% 30%
nP/M No Yes High 30% 24%
nP/nM No No Moderate 26% 29%
Figure 4.3: User typology and their proportions in our target datasets, with a hypothesis
about the amount of privacy a user could aain from ZipPhone.
4.4.1 Datasets
Both datasets were collected primarily from university aliates who carried phones
instrumented with soware to log phone network aachment and activity.
1. PhoneLab [83] is an Android testbed comprising 593 phones distributed to students
at the University of Bualo campus. As a part of this testbed, users contributed
geotagged traces of their cellular network associations. We use 24 months from
January 2015 to January 2017 of cellular network association traces from PhoneLab
to assess the privacy preservation potential of ZipPhone.
2. RealityMining [42] is a dataset released by MIT that tracks a group of 100 mo-
bile phone users across various contexts. Similar to PhoneLab, RealityMining con-
tains geotagged network association information. For our analysis, we leverage 12
months of RealityMining data from July 2004 to July 2005.
We are unaware of other public datasets that could be used to analyze our algorithms.
(We led IRB protocol 2017-3900 as part of this project, and it was approved as exempt.)
4.4.2 Behaviour that aects attacker accuracy
We begin by characterizing user behaviour. Intuitively, there are two behavioural
traits that aect mobile users’ privacy: (i) Predictability, or to what extent users travel over
xed routes; and (ii) Mixing behaviour, or how likely are users to visit popular locations
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that see a large volume of other ZipPhone users. To highlight the eect of user behaviour
on privacy, we categorized PhoneLab and RealityMining users post hoc into four groups:
• predictable (P) or unpredictable (nP); and
• mixing (M) or not mixing (nM).
e four resulting user types are described in Figure 4.3, where we also set forth a hypoth-
esis of how user behaviour would aect privacy. We verify and conrm these hypothesis
in our evaluation (Section 4.4.3).
Predictability We calculate the user predictability in terms of the similarity of the set of
cellphone towers they visited during the testing and training period. For each user, let
Cpre be the set of towers visited during the training phase and Cpost be the set of towers
visited in the testing phase. We express the predictability in terms of a user’s Jaccard
similarity score between Cpre and Cpost, dened as
JC =
Cpre ∩ Cpost
Cpre ∪ Cpost , (4.1)
where 0 ≤ JC ≤ 1. JC = 0 when the sets of visited towers in testing and training are
completely disjoint, while JC = 1 means that the sets of visited towers in testing and
training are the same. Intuitively, a higher JC means a more predictable trajectory.
Figure 4.4 (top) presents the aacker’s accuracy (i.e., the probability that a user would
be identied) as a function of the users’ Jaccard score in the PhoneLab dataset. We note
that the trends and respective thresholds are similar for theRealityMining dataset and omit
these results due to space limitations. For this setup, 91% of users fall within the 0.0–0.4
Jaccard score range. For these users, we see an increasing trend in the aacker’s accuracy
as the Jaccard score grows. Using this analysis of our test dataset, we set the Jaccard score
to 0.1 as a cut o to dierentiate between predictable users (such with JC > 0.1) and
unpredictable users (such with JC ≤ 0.1).
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Figure 4.4: Le: User predictability versus aacker accuracy, showing that aacker ac-
curacy is near zero with low predictability. Right: User mixing versus aacker accuracy,
showing that median accuracy falls to zero as user mixing increases. e plots were com-
puted from the PhoneLab dataset. e presented results are for a maximum oine time
period of 30 seconds and a set utility of 95%. Utility and accuracy metrics are discussed in
detail in Section 4.4.3.
Mixing behaviour We establish a mixing scoreMC as a metric that evaluates a user’s
likelihood to mix with other ZipPhone users. Intuitively, the higher the mixing score, the
more ecient ID switching will be and the harder it will be for the adversary to evade
a user’s privacy. We calculate MC for each individual user. Let tki be the duration of
time a user i ∈ (1, N) spends at tower k ∈ (1, K). During the period tki , other users
j ∈ (1, N ′), j 6= i, N ′ ⊂ N , may arrive and depart from tower k. Let τ kij be the time
of user j’s arrival or departure. Intuitively, tki and τ kij dene the temporal granularity of
tower mobility and ZipPhone user encounter events, respectively, from the perspective of
a single user i. Let C(τ kij) be the number of users in user i’s vicinity at time τ kij . We dene
the mixing score as:
MC =
K∑
k=1
N ′∑
j=1
C(τ kij)
τ kij − τ ki(j−1)
(4.2)
Figure 4.4 (boom) presents the aacker’s accuracy as a function of the users’ mixing
score in the PhoneLab dataset. e trends and respective thresholds are similar for the
RealityMining dataset. We see that the aacker’s accuracy deteriorates as the users’ mix-
ing score increases. Based on this analysis, we set a mixing score of 4 as the cuto to
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determine whether a user is mixing or not mixing, i.e. users withMC ≤ 4 are not mixing
and these withMC > 4 are mixing.
User typology in our datasets. As detailed earlier, we dierentiate between four types
of users based on their predictability and mixing behaviour. Using the presented analysis
in Figure 4.4, we set a Jaccard similarity threshold of 0.1 and mixing score threshold of
4. We note that these thresholds are solely used to establish the user topology in the
following evaluation and do not play a role in the prole classication carried out by the
aacker. Figure 4.3 presents the amount of users that fall in each user type category. We
see a relatively even user representation across all categories. We use these user types and
the corresponding user populations in all results presented in the evaluation of ZipPhone
(Section 4.4.3).
4.4.3 Results
To determine the aect of ZipPhone on the utility and privacy of users, we simulated
the protocol using the PhoneLab and RealityMining datasets. In these simulations, the
aacker uses the inference algorithms outlined in Section 4.3.3.2 to develop a location
prole for each user based on two months of training data, and labels anonymous traces
in the next month.
4.4.3.1 Utility-privacy trade-o
We evaluated the utility-privacy tension with regard to the four user types. We quan-
tify privacy gained in terms of reduced aacker accuracy. We measured loss of utility
in terms of time spent oine during the testing period. Figure 4.5 displays the privacy
gained by each user group during the one-month testing periods.
Users gained signicant privacy from sacricing 5% utility, on average remaining on-
line for 9.5 minutes, and going oine for 30 seconds. In particular, Type P/M (predictable
but mixing users) gained 45% in the PhoneLab dataset, and 49% in the RealityMining
dataset. Interestingly, Types nP/M and P/nM also show a similar trend: Type nP/M ben-
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Figure 4.5: Le: PhoneLab. Right: RealityMining. In both datasets, predictable but mix-
ing users (Type P/M) gain the most from using ZipPhone. Ten test traces were evaluated
per user, and accuracy is represented as a mean of the proportion of successful reidenti-
cations per user. Error bars represent a 95% condence interval.
ets from having the divided traces be less predictable, and for Type P/nM any small
amount of predictability is reduced to none. Type nP/nM does not mix, and enjoys uni-
formly high privacy because they are unpredictable. Users were more private in general
in the PhoneLab, since it represented a larger community of users, making mixing easier
for the user, and user inference more dicult for the aacker.
4.4.3.2 Trace length and location proling
e main driver of aacker accuracy is trace length. In these experiments, the aacker
tries to identify an independent trace of varying length. Figure 4.6 shows the result.
In general, the longer the trace, the more identiable (and thus less private) an in-
dividual is. Users who exhibit more predictable behaviour have less privacy; generally,
they benet from traces that are at most one hour long. In other words, predictable users
should change their identier at least once per hour while in motion. ose who travel to
unique locations as compared to others benet signicantly less from the shorter trace.
is result highlights the benet of ZipPhone. Users should change their identiers
more than once per hour, and this system obviates the need to physically change an iden-
tier, and handles this process automatically. While a temporary SIM device may grant
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Figure 4.6: Le: PhoneLab. Right: RealityMining. Users lose a signicant amount of
privacy when traces are on the order of one day long. e accuracy at one month is
equivalent to the accuracy in Figure 4.5 at 100% utility.
some measure of privacy, a system that renews a user’s identier a lot more quickly can
be a lot more eective.
4.4.3.3 Compromises in utility
While users may renew identiers by prearranging mixing strategies with other users,
such coordination is impractical. A frequent enough renewal strategy and long enough
renewal times allow mix-zones to naturally form, which enables users to mix without any
coordination. In Figure 4.7 (top), we examine the amount of time a user should remain
oine. e frequency of renewal is informed by the utility desired, which we set at 95%.
For users to gain privacy during identier renewal, they must remain oine long
enough to mix with other users. Additionally, users must not have a xed oine time,
since this would be susceptible to a timing aack. Users must choose an oine time that
is not so long to be disruptive, but not so short as to oer lile privacy. e ZipPhone
population’s policy should x a chosen utility, and employ a cool down time between each
user’s identier renewal based on that desired utility. For example, if users’ oine-times
are 30 seconds, and are aiming to maintain 95% utility, they will keep every identity for
at least 30 seconds÷ (1− 0.95) =10 minutes.
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Figure 4.7: Le: the eect of mixing-time on privacy while maintaining a 95% utility
for the PhoneLab dataset. Right: privacy/utility of all users depending on whether their
priority is privacy, phone calls, or screen use. Calls can be prioritized without sacricing
privacy. However, remaining online while the screen is on signicantly reduces privacy.
Because going oine for 30 seconds can be fairly disruptive, we analyzed scenarios
where reconnections are disallowed if (i) the user is in the middle of a phone call, or
(ii) the device screen is active. is data was available in only the PhoneLab dataset.
Since phone calls were intermient, active calls could be kept online without sacricing
privacy. However, within the oine periods, users would on average miss 4 calls out
of 24 per month while maintaining 95% utility. Looking at screen usage, we show in
Figure 4.7 (boom) that users could preserve active usage of phone undisturbed, but in
doing so would sacrice additional privacy by a small amount (i.e. about 2% across all
utility levels).
4.5 Integrating ZipPhone with emerging mobile networks
In this section we discuss how ZipPhone could be integrated in emerging mobile cel-
lular networks towards improved user privacy. We rst present necessary background
on user authentication in emerging cellular networks. We then detail how ZipPhone can
utilize these networks for privacy-preserving services without requiring network modi-
cations. Finally, we present empirical results for user-side energy overhead.
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4.5.1 Background
Traditionally, hardware SIM cards installed in mobile devices provide the basis for user
provisioning in Mobile Network Operators (MNO). Each SIM has a unique International
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). At the MNO’s Home Location Registry (HLR) an entry
is created connecting the IMSI with an Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory
Number (MSISDN; i.e., a phone number). At the Authentication Center (AuC) the IMSI is
paired with a Ki value and used for user authentication.
is approach is plagued with high overhead, wasted allocations, and manual pro-
cesses. To address these limitations, the eSIMs standard [15] has been developed, which
allows programmatic and on-the-y provisioning of a user’s identity on a network. With
eSIMs, mobile users can maintain multiple simultaneous mobile network identities and
use heterogeneous services from one or multiple MNOs. ree out of the four major car-
riers in the US currently support eSIM, with one major carrier supporting eSIM in 42 other
countries worldwide [16].
eSIMs introduce new components to user management that are useful for ZipPhone.
Similar to traditional SIMs, the eSIM functional prole [3] carries phone identication in-
formation and is jointly maintained in the MNO’s HLR and the AuC. e Subscription
Manager Data Preparation (SM-DP+), is responsible for provisioning a user’s prole onto
the eSIM. us, the SM-DP+ is the rst point of communication between an aspiring sub-
scriber and the MNO, from which the subscriber obtains their functional prole. ere
is no upper limit on the amount of proles an eSIM can maintain; this number depends
on (i) the size of a single prole, (ii) the eSIM integrated memory and, (iii) the opera-
tor’s preferences. As an example, T-Mobile currently supports up to 10 concurrent eSIM
Proles [2].
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4.5.2 Proposed ZipPhone Architecture
4.5.2.1 Overview
ZipPhone can be realized as a smartphone application. Upon installation and then
periodically, the ZipPhone app will anonymously acquire multiple functional proles and
associated service quants from the MNO’s SM-DP+. We dene a service quant as a set
of mobile services (i.e. data, text messages and voice calls) that the subscriber will use
while active with the particular prole and note that these quants can be obtained in the
form of an anonymous prepaid service [17, 18]. ZipPhone then programmatically swaps
these proles as discussed in Section 4.3 and uses the corresponding service quant for the
duration in which a prole is active. is functionality can be achieved without explicit
cooperation from the network provider or any modications in the network as long as
the network provider is eSIM-capable and oers anonymous prepaid plans.
4.5.2.2 Purchasing Credentials
ZipPhone requires that users anonymously purchase proles without linking to a con-
sistent nancial or network identier. is purchase would be a signicant challenge to
deploying ZipPhone as it must also not be used to prole the user. Here we oer a sketch
of how it could be done.
Zcash [61,96] oers a basis for such purchases as follows. e MNO advertises a Zcash
address for purchasing credentials and a price per purchased prole. e user creates a
public-private key pair, and issues a transaction that transfers the purchase amount to the
MNO, and includes its own public key as part of the transaction (which could be encrypted
with the public key of MNO’s address for greater security). e MNO responds with a
data only transaction that includes the set of credentials, encrypted with the provided
public key. is exchange must occur separately for each credential purchased, each with
a dierent public key and each from a dierent Zcash source address, so that a series of
purchases cannot be linked as belonging to the same user. ese requirements are easy to
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provide with Zcash and can be performed programmatically. ere is an eort to deploy
Zcash’s zero-knowledge mechanisms on Ethereum as well.
e user’s transactions should not be overtly issued from the same IP address, as that
would allow linking of the purchases. Protocols such as Dandelion++ [47] allow trans-
actions to be issued to Zcash with network anonymity. A ZipPhone users would carry a
series of pre-purchased proles, and use them in a random order.
We note that this entire scenario could be handled by a third-party Mobile Virtual
Network Operator (MVNO) that resells for the MNO. In that case, the MVNO should issue
signaling to the MNO to cancel the IMSI a period of time aer they are rst used (e.g., 15–
30 minutes).
4.5.2.3 Communication without Leaking Identity or Location
For an additional layer of privacy, ZipPhone users should ignore the MSISDN (phone
numbers) provided by a prole. In other words, users should not use MSISDN-based ser-
vices such as text and voice calls and instead should rely on IP based services over the
data plan. If a ZipPhone user initiated or received overt LTE or unencrypted VoIP calls,
they risk being identied via a prole of call records held by the carrier. Note that the
E911 service, which is tied to a handset and not a user or SIM, would be still available if
needed.
Some protection would be gained from using an encrypted VoIP service, since it would
not reveal to the carrier the identity of the user’s contact, whom she calls, or from whom
she receives calls. However, if the IP address of the VoIP service is unique, then con-
necting to it would help the MNO link a collection of proles together. An anonymous
VoIP service, such as Torfone can be used; note that anonymous VoIP has a performance
penalty [78].
In general, an anonymous communication systems, i.e., Tor, must be used for all Zip-
Phone communication (voice or data). However, there is one change required. Tor chooses
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Figure 4.8: Experimental setup for power measurements on 3G and 4G networks.
a consistent, single guard relay to start all three-relay circuits through the Tor network.
If ZipPhone users send all trac to a single guard relays, it would be a consistent identi-
er despite changing IMSIs. Instead of a guard at the start of the circuit, ZipPhone users
should use a consistent relay as the exit. is switching of roles allows ZipPhone users
to receive all protections against the Predecessor Aack [113] that Tor normally provides
via guard nodes at the entry.
4.5.3 ZipPhone Overhead
ZipPhone triggers periodic disassociation/association from the mobile carrier, which
together incur additional baery draw and connect/disconnect delays on the mobile de-
vice. us, in this section, we quantify the overhead in terms of baery drain and latency,
incurred by ZipPhone on 3G and 4G networks.
Experimental setup. In order to evaluate the power consumption of mobile network
association/disassociation, we used a Samsung Galaxy S5 Duos phone with a bypassed
baery and a Google Fi SIM card, and a Monsoon Power Meter. We connected the phone
to the main channel of the power meter, as illustrated in Figure 4.8, which allowed us to
both power up the phone and measure its energy consumption. In order to measure the
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Figure 4.9: Power trace for 3G (le) and 4G (right) association and disassociation.
power draw at 3G and 4G networks, we forced the phone to the respective technology
and sampled the power draw at a granularty of 200µs. We used the phone’s Seings
screen to toggle between Airplane Mode OFF and Airplane Mode ON every 10 seconds
for 4G and every 20 seconds for 3G. We disabled all background services on the phone.
is ensured that we are only measuring the power draw from association/disassociation,
plus a baseline of about 700mW used by the display for the Airplane Seings page. For
each of 3G and 4G we completed 10 full association/disassociation cycles. e average
experienced time and power to connect inform our simulaiton results.
Figure 4.9 presents a zoomed version of a single associate/disassociate cycle for 3G
(top) and 4G (boom)1. ere are several important points to note on each trace. First,
the red vertical line indicates the phone’s transition from Airplane Mode ON to OFF state,
which immediately triggers a network association. Aer the association procedure com-
pletes, the phone enters FACH (Forward Access CHannel) state in anticipation for the
user to begin accessing the Internet. Since this does not happen in our controlled activ-
ity, the phone futher transitions into IDLE state. At the instant designated with a green
vertical line, we toggle Airplane Mode ON, which immediately triggers a disassociation
procedure.
A ZipPhone user would experience two types of overhead: (i) oine time, and (ii) power
draw. We measure the oine time as the time between the beginning of network associa-
1Note that the timescale (i.e. the x-axis range) for 3G is longer than that for 4G, because on 3G the phone
takes signicantly longer to transition to IDLE mode compared to 4G.
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mean (std dev)
3G
Power to connect (mW) 2,098 (435)
Power to disconnect (mW) 1,282 (157)
Time to connect (s) 5.0 (0.8)
Time to disconnect (s) 4.0 (1.0)
4G
Power to connect (mW) 2,006 (171)
Power to disconnect (mW) 1,120 (295)
Time to connect (s) 2.6 (0.2)
Time to disconnect (s) 3.0 (1.2)
Figure 4.10: Time and power overhead incurred by a single association/disassociation
procedure on 3G and 4G in our experiments. Results are averaged over 10 runs.
tion and the beginning of the FACH state. We measure the power overhead as the sum of
power to associate and power to disassociate, whereby the power to associate is incurred
from the begining of the network association to the beginning of the FACH state, while
the power to disassociate is measured from the beginning till the end of the disassociation
procedure.
Figure 4.10 presents the average incurred overhead for our measurement campaign.
We see that the oine time incurred by 3G is nearly double that of 4G. e power con-
sumption, on another hand, is comparable across the two technologies. We use these
results to quantify the baery usage per day for users in our datasets. To this end, we con-
vert the measured power consumption for a single connect/disconnect from mW to mWh
using the values in Figure 4.10. We assume a 3.85V baery with a capacity of 2800mAh,
which is typical. On the x-axis we control the desired user utility from 0.8 to 1, which
eectively controls the amount of network disconnect/connect cycles a user will incur
for the duration of a day. We multiply that number by the energy consumption (in mWh)
and then divide by the baery’s capacity to determine what fraction of the baery is con-
sumed due to ZipPhone. Figure 4.11 presents our results, which indicate that the baery
usage is at most 1% per day regardless of technology (3G or 4G) or desired privacy.
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Figure 4.11: Baery usage does not exceed 1% per day, regardless of desired privacy or
network type.
Network control overhead. Finally, although we do not explicitly quantify it, we do not
expect that ZipPhone users would incur signicantly higher signalling overhead on the
cellular network compared to non-ZipPhone users. In order to release network resources
and optimize clients’ baery life, network providers forcefully disassociate users from the
network aer a network-dened timeout [92], typically in the order of a few seconds as
illustrated by our measurements in Figure 4.9. Since ZipPhone only operates when a user
is inactive, the control overhead incurred by the network will be comparable with that
from non-ZipPhone users.
4.6 Discussion
4.6.1 Limitations
Our technique has limitations. We require devices that accept soware SIMs; these
are not common in the marketplace now, though easy to provide. Another limitation
is that users would never be able to quantify their privacy gains as there is no way to
determine the number of other ZipPhone users. In addition, we do not address other
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privacy risks, which include physical aacks (e.g., radio frequency ngerprinting [39]),
soware vulnerabilities, use of location-based services, advertising ngerprints, browser
cookies, and malware.
Our evaluations are limited as well. For example, we do not explicitly consider users
mixing when they are stationary; if they do, aackers could also consider these addi-
tional mixes when linking. A more advanced aacker’s classier might account for yet
additional features (e.g., time of day or favourite locations [120]) to increase accuracy.
Conversely, users could develop more ecacious methods to prevent linking. Finally, our
results are tied to our datasets, which are relatively small and limited to populations from
universities. Obtaining a usable large-scale dataset is dicult, as MNOs are generally
unwilling to anonymize and share such data. Furthermore, collecting user mobility data
rst-hand requires a fairly involved longitudinal eort.
Despite these limitations, this study introduced an eective method for mobile net-
work users to take charge of their own location privacy, and provided a detailed look at
the ecacy of such a service.
4.6.2 Ethical implications
Mobile devices are an essential part of most people’s daily routine. Accordingly, there
is a tension between the right to location privacy and the need to investigate crimes and
threats to public safety. e techniques we introduce and evaluate are eective to protect-
ing privacy, but unfortunately would thwart a common method of investigation as well.
Any deployment of ZipPhone would have to take into account this dicult, zero-sum
game ethical dilemma.
4.7 Related Work
Our study is related to a broader category of prior work on location privacy. Most prior
work assumes the service provider is trusted and in fact responsible for user privacy. Prior
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approaches have a variety of goals, including: (i) properly anonymizing mobility datasets
before public release; (ii) adding privacy for users of locations based services; and (iii)
increasing location privacy for mobile device users from third-party aackers but not the
service provider itself. In contrast to these works, our goal is to provide mobile users
location privacy from the wireless provider itself. is presents a unique challenge: the
user is responsible for her own privacy, and the only control she has over this is whether
to remain connected to the service at any moment in time.
Location privacy with provider cooperation. Many studies focus on enlisting a
trusted carrier to protect against a third party aacker [50, 55, 56, 76]. Reed et al. [95]
propose privacy from the carrier using onion routing, but does not consider the direct
connection that must be made to a tower. Federrath et al. [49] propose a similar scheme
that prevents linkability of calls between two parties but omit critical details regard-
ing authentication to the carrier. Fatemi et al. [48] propose an anonymous scheme for
UMTS using identity-based encryption, but unlike our approach, their scheme involves
the carrier in the cryptographic exchange; they enumerate the vulnerabilities of similar
works [66,89,118,121]. Kesdogan et al. [70] proposes using a trusted third party to create
pseudonyms for GSM users, but also routes all calls through that provider, which allows
it to characterize the calling paern and infer the caller.
User-driven trajectory privacy. Mix zones [25,52] can be employed by a user against a
provider aacker, in cases where the network service provider is non-cooperative. While
the concept of mix zones is fairly old, it remains the only available option for users who
want to hide their own location privacy from a service provider. Work in VANETs also uses
mix zones to protect vehicle trajectory [46, 58, 79]. Given that the focus is on trajectory,
these studies do not consider location proling. Other work involves the introduction
of false information [72, 98]. Few studies use this concept to protect the user from an
omnipresent network aacker. Chan [30] focuses on call metadata privacy, rather than
location privacy.
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User-driven proling privacy. Work that increases the privacy of location-based
services (LBS) [62, 85, 110, 111] generally add noise to location queries. ese works are
not viable or applicable against an untrusted service provider: a user cannot manipulate
which tower they connect to, and the provider knows the physical locations of the towers
serving users.
Dataset protection. Works that aim to prevent leaks in personally identiable in-
formation in shared or publicly released datasets [119] primarily rely on obfuscation.
ese works also include eorts to prevent trajectory recovery [57, 106]. Older work on
deanonymization of private traces of mobile users assume the user’s pseudonym is un-
changed throughout the trace. But a small amount of external information, such as the
person’s home or work address [65], can deanonymize an obfuscated trace [24, 25, 53, 75,
80,82] given a consistent identier. Zang and Bolot [120] show that suitably anonymizing
a trace of 25 million cellular users across 50 states (30 billion records total) requires only
that users have the same pseudonym for no longer than a day. A day’s duration is un-
suitable for Zang and Bolot’s goal of supporting researchers that wish to characterize the
behaviour of users over time (while maintaining their privacy). On the other hand, the re-
sult is promising for users seeking privacy, who might be able to change their pseudonyms
much more frequently than once per day.
Dierential privacy. More recently, dierential privacy approaches [41,81] are used to
add noise to datasets while preserving its aggregate characteristics. Palamidessi et al. [19]
introduce geo-indistinguishability, and ElSalmouny & Gambs [45] further discuss (D, )-
location privacy. Xiong et al. [114, 115] formalize situations where location queries can
be temporally correlated and linked. ese methods all assume the service provider is
trusted and are, thus, not applicable to our problem seing.
Outside threats. Several studies protect against third party aackers and vulnerabilities
in 3GPP implementations [60,63]. Khan et al. [71] provide a cryptographic mechanism to
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generate LTE pseudonyms and prevent third-party aackers or IMSI catchers from linking
users.
In comparison to related work, we dier in that we do not trust the wireless service to
ensure the user’s privacy, and we assume in our analysis that the adversary is aempting
to link together traces. Our evaluations are based on traces of real users [42, 83], which
allows us to quantify the periodicity of identier changes in the context of modern cellular
infrastructure.
4.8 Concluding remarks
Our work demonstrates that, fundamentally, users do not need to trust wireless ser-
vice providers with their location information. We evaluated a deanonymization aack
that uses a combination of location proling and trajectory linking, and showed that it is
eective in identifying long-term pseudonyms. Using two separate datasets of call detail
records, we then demonstrated that a ZipPhone user can defend against such aacks by
renewing her identier regularly. We also evaluated the utility cost in terms of time oine
and baery life, and showed it to be minimal. Users who do not use any anonymization
scheme are always identiable. In our trace-driven evaluations, a non-ZipPhone user
who is habitual and conventional (predictable and mixing) who renews her pseudonym
monthly is identiable 69% of the time, and one who uses ZipPhone is identiable 24% of
the time if she sacrices 5% of her utility and 1% of baery life, towards a lower bound
of 19% if she sacrices more. In other words, users can signicantly reduce their identi-
ability by up to 45% by renewing their pseudonym aer oine periods consuming less
than 5% of their uptime.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY
e principles of, and rules on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
their personal data should, whatever their nationality or residence, respect their fundamental
rights and freedoms, in particular their right to the protection of personal data. is Regulation
is intended to contribute to the accomplishment of an area of freedom, security and justice and of
an economic union, to economic and social progress, to the strengthening and the convergence
of the economies within the internal market, and to the well-being of natural persons.
Recital 2, General Data Protection Regulation, 2016
ese last two decades have seen a rapid progression in mobile technology, and along
with it a slew of privacy issues. In this thesis, I looked at the privacy issues inherent in
persistent cellular connectivity, with regard to each data stakeholder that we are expected
to trust. My collaborators and I found a vulnerability in an industry-standard advertising
framework that allows advertisers to continue tracking users that have enabled Limit Ad
Tracking. We determined that cellular connection quality is enough for a remote aacker
to narrow down the location of a user to a path travelled. We established that funda-
mentally, to be able to privately use a cellular network without revealing location to a
cellular provider, a user must change their SIM information, and in doing so, sacrice
some amount of utility.
But I argue that these issues are merely growing pains. Policy is catching up to regulate
private data usage. Aggressive study of privacy issues is paramount to ensuring personal
data safety, and quelling technophobia. e GDPR already denes broad policies to protect
data, for example, by requiring explicit consent for services to use cookies and persistent
information storage to track users, and by requiring explicit consent for users to have
their data processed. Enforcement and more specic legal clarication of these policies
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are another story, but this is progress in developing comprehensive privacy rights. While
the GDPR protects citizens of the European Union, other jurisdictions have followed suit,
and hopefully many more will also do so in the future.
In the end, the reason we research privacy is to inform users on how to protect in-
formation that is personal and intimate to them, and to inform policymakers, service
providers, and developers on how beer to protect the rights and freedoms to privacy. A
combination of good policy and consumer vigilance is needed to protect personal privacy.
5.1 Recommended policies
1. When storage of user data is regulated, it is usually in the context of data being
stored on a server. As we have discovered in Chapter 2, special consideration must
also be given to information that is stored on the client device.
2. Network access traces can justiably be logged for quality control purposes. ese
traces, even if they are solely metadata and contentless, should be treated like per-
sonal data, as they may help reveal a user’s location (Chapters 3 and 4).
3. Make personally collected personal data transparent to the user, and easily accessi-
ble (i.e. Right of Access, or Subject Access Rights). is gives users an opportunity
to study the potential of their data, and even sell it to researchers. Not only does
this give users the knowledge of what is actually being collected, but it could also
make it much easier to do privacy research.
5.2 Recommendations for privacy-preserving behaviour
ese are recommendations — based on results from this thesis — to protect your
identity, location, and trajectory from any aacker, while using a mobile device.
1. Use a device that is unlikely to have been compromised by a malicious party. All
studies carried out in this thesis assumed that the user’s device was trustworthy.
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Totally ensuring the trustworthiness of a device is nearly impossible, but popular
devices are well studied by security researchers, and tested by the public.
2. Untrusted apps should only be allowed to connect to the network or be given ge-
olocation access if necessary. If temporary network usage is needed, then allow
network access only temporarily. estion unnecessary permissions requests.
3. Revealing your location, even anonymously, is always against your privacy inter-
ests. Do so conservatively.
4. A device that you anonymously use long-term is likely to reveal your identity. You
should consider such a device no longer anonymous aer one day, especially if you
bring it to areas you frequent.
5. To avoid marketing tracking, disable or reset the advertising identier on your de-
vice regularly. If reseing, clear the data and cache on apps that contain advertising
at the same time. In the same vein, clear browser cache and web storage regularly
on any device that you own, and use an ad blocker.
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